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ABSTRACT 
Empirical evidence (e.g. Eldenburg and Vines 2004; Leone and Van Horn 2005; 
Ballantine et al. 2007; Eldenburg et al. 2011) demonstrates that nonprofit hospital managers 
respond to competing institutional and regulatory pressures by engaging in various forms of 
financial reporting manipulation.  While some recent research in accounting (e.g. Dyreng et al. 
2012; McGuire et al. 2012) shows that religious social norms can deter this undesirable behavior, 
these studies focus on the private, for-profit sector and use a location-based measure of 
religiosity.  This study extends this line of research by using a more direct measure of religious 
social norms, the ownership affiliation of a hospital, in a nonprofit setting.  Using quarterly and 
annual data for all nonprofit hospitals in the state of California, this study empirically examines 
the relationship between the nature of hospital ownership (i.e. secular vs. religious) and two 
types of financial reporting manipulation: earnings management and classification management.  
Consistent with social norm theory, findings indicate that religious hospitals manage earnings to 
a lesser extent than secular hospitals.  However, religious and secular hospitals do not appear to 
differ with respect to strategic charity care classification.  Supplemental tests indicate that the 
earnings management result is driven by fourth-quarter differences and that the effect is 
especially pronounced for the Medicaid payor.  Additional analyses also consider a potential 
shock to managerial incentives as a result of recent healthcare regulatory changes.  Although 
overall earnings management appears to be greater after the passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act in 2010, there is no evidence to suggest that the effect of hospital ownership 
on financial reporting changed as a result of the legislation.  This study contributes to the 
iii 
  
growing literature on the influence of religious affiliation on corporate behavior, as well as the 
nature, timing, and extent of financial reporting decisions of nonprofit hospitals.  Furthermore, it 
has important implications for audit firms, creditors, potential donors, accounting researchers, 
and other hospital stakeholders.  Finally, results from this research should generalize to other 
large industries within the nonprofit sector (e.g. higher education).
iv 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Overview 
Financial reporting manipulation is a significant concern for information users and has 
been a focus of academic research for many years.  Recent research in accounting (e.g. Dyreng et 
al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012) has shown that religious social norms can potentially deter 
financial reporting misconduct and act as an effective governance mechanism.  However, this 
line of research almost exclusively focuses on the private, for-profit sector.  Furthermore, these 
studies use an indirect measure of religiosity based on the population’s religious affiliation 
within a particular geographic location.  The primary purpose of this paper is to extend this 
literature by using a more direct measure of religiosity, the ownership affiliation of a hospital, in 
a nonprofit setting.  Specifically, this research empirically examines the relationship between the 
nature of hospital ownership (i.e. secular vs. religious) and two types of financial reporting 
manipulation: earnings management and classification management.  In this study, earnings 
management refers to a strategic attempt by managers to increase or decrease reported income 
via accounting manipulation, not through the use of real activities (e.g. discretionary 
expenditures)
1
.  Classification management refers to a strategic classification of costs, such that 
financial results are improved on one or more dimensions of performance (e.g. charity care) 
without changing the amount of reported income. 
Nonprofit hospital managers face various competing institutional and regulatory 
pressures that provide ample incentives to manipulate reported financial performance.  Despite 
                                                 
1
 See Eldenburg et al. (2011) for evidence of real earnings management in nonprofit hospitals.   
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lacking a profit-maximizing objective, nonprofit hospitals have incentives that stem from the 
debt and executive labor markets to increase reported profits, especially when faced with a 
potential net loss.  Simultaneously, they also have reasons to moderate the level of earnings, 
primarily to avoid external scrutiny from taxing authorities, healthcare regulators, prospective 
donors, insurance companies, and other third parties.   
Prior research 
As discussed above, nonprofit hospital managers have opposing incentives to manipulate 
upward or downward the amount of profit they report.  Consistent with these competing motives, 
research has shown that nonprofit hospitals may strategically manage earnings to a target just 
above zero (e.g. Leone and Van Horn 2005; Ballantine et al. 2007).  This kink in the earnings 
distribution suggests that nonprofit hospitals behave much like for-profit firms in that they prefer 
to avoid reporting a loss, even though they do not have a true profit motive (e.g. Hayn 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999).  Recent accounting research finds that 
earnings management activities in nonprofit hospitals are especially prevalent when reported 
levels of charity care exceed external expectations (Vansant 2013). 
Additionally, managers in nonprofit hospitals also have intrinsic and economic incentives 
to report favorable performance on key metrics.  Research in accounting has documented that 
nonprofit hospitals engage in certain types of classification management to improve external 
perceptions of performance on specific measures.  For example, Krishnan and Yetman (2011) 
find evidence that managers shift costs to improve their program service ratio (“PSR”), an 
important efficiency measure in the nonprofit sector.
2
  As a nonprofit hospital, providing charity 
care to the community is an integral part of its mission and an important determinant for renewal 
                                                 
2
 The PSR is calculated by dividing program service expenses by total expenses.  A higher ratio is desired because it 
implies that administrative and other non-core activities are a small portion of total expenses. 
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of tax exemptions at the federal, state, and local levels.
3
  Consequently, managers have a motive 
and opportunity to strategically shift costs from bad debt to charity care to appear more 
charitable without artificially inflating or deflating the level of reported income.  This incentive 
is particularly salient following Illinois’ revocation of a large nonprofit hospital’s tax-exempt 
status for providing inadequate levels of charity care.  Further, an article in the New York Times 
and a joint study by The Charlotte Observer and The News & Observer have publicly questioned 
tax breaks for nonprofit hospitals that generate high profits, yet provide minimal amounts of free 
care to the poor (Alexander et al. 2012; Rosenthal 2013).  In response to these external pressures 
to show favorable levels of charity care, Eldenburg and Vines (2004) show that hospitals do 
strategically shift bad debt costs to charity care, particularly those with high levels of available 
cash. 
Several studies have shown that religion can play an important role in shaping various 
types of corporate behavior, including the types of financial reporting manipulation documented 
above.  For example, the nature and extent of religiosity has been shown to be a major factor in 
decisions regarding investment (Hilary and Hui 2009; Shu et al. 2012), going concern reporting 
(Omer et al. 2013), tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2012; Boone et al. 2013), and financial reporting 
(Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012; Swenson 2012).  However, research has largely 
ignored the extent to which religion plays a role in the financial reporting process of nonprofit 
healthcare organizations.  This oversight is especially problematic because religion plays a major 
role in the operating and financial decisions of a large number of nonprofit organizations, 
especially hospitals. 
                                                 
3
 As defined in Appendix 1, charity care is the difference between gross patient revenue (based on full established 
charges) for services rendered to patients who are unable to pay for all or part of the services provided, and the 
amount paid by or on behalf of the patient.  See Appendix 1 for definitions of other key healthcare terms as they 
pertain to this study. 
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Hypotheses 
To address this gap in the literature, this study empirically examines the effect of 
religious ownership on financial reporting manipulation by formally testing two hypotheses.  The 
first hypothesis addresses earnings management, typically considered to be the most egregious 
form of financial reporting manipulation.  Social norm theory and the results of recent 
accounting studies (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012) predict that religious hospitals 
manage earnings less than secular hospitals.  H1 is formally stated below:   
H1: Managers in religious hospitals engage in less earnings management than those in 
secular hospitals. 
 
The second hypothesis addresses managerial incentives to reclassify bad debt costs as 
charity care (i.e. classification management).  While all nonprofit hospitals, both secular and 
religious, are motivated to show favorable charity care amounts to maintain tax-exempt status 
and avoid regulatory scrutiny, religious hospitals may feel more pressure to do so because of 
their spiritual missions.  Religious hospitals may strategically manage performance through this 
classification behavior, especially if other avenues of manipulation (e.g. earnings management) 
are constrained by religious norms as hypothesized in H1 above.  As H2 indicates below, the 
expectation is that there are higher levels of classification management in religious hospitals than 
in secular hospitals.   
H2: Managers in religious hospitals engage in more classification management than those 
in secular hospitals. 
 
Importance 
Understanding the financial reporting behavior of secular and religious nonprofit 
hospitals is important because of their widespread impact on the U.S. economy.  Specific to the 
role of religion in reporting behavior, focusing on the healthcare industry is appropriate because 
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of the industry’s size and ownership variability within the nonprofit sector (i.e. secular-owned vs. 
religious-owned).  Additionally, religion has a considerable amount of influence in many 
nonprofit hospitals.  According to the American Hospital Association (“AHA”), there are 
approximately 2,900 nonprofit (i.e. tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code) hospitals in the United States, which represent 57.9% of all acute care general hospitals, 
with the remainder comprised of for-profit (21.4%) and governmental (20.7%) facilities.
4
  Of this 
nonprofit total, a significant portion (roughly 16.0%) are owned and operated by a religious 
organization (AHA 2014).  Because of their nonprofit status, these hospitals receive federal, 
state, and local tax exemptions that total over $12 billion annually (Rosenthal 2013).   
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) estimates that U.S. healthcare spending as a 
percent of gross domestic product has steadily risen from 9.5% in 1985 to 16.4% in 2011.  Under 
current law, this percentage is projected to rise to approximately 22.0% of GDP by 2038 (CBO 
2013).  While these figures include all healthcare companies, hospitals make up a substantial 
portion of the industry.  Despite this significance, there has been relatively limited research on 
the financial reporting behavior of nonprofit hospitals.  Furthermore, to the knowledge of the 
author, this is one of the first studies to investigate the effect of religious affiliation on multiple 
types of financial reporting manipulation in a nonprofit healthcare setting.
5
 
Methodology 
Industry-specific proxies for earnings management and classification management are 
calculated and used in numerous regression models.  First, a contractual allowance-based 
                                                 
4
 As defined in Appendix 1, an acute care general hospital is a licensed hospital having a duly constituted governing 
body with overall administrative and professional responsibility and an organized medical staff which provides 24- 
hour inpatient care, including the following basic services: medical, nursing, surgical, anesthesia, laboratory, 
radiology, pharmacy, and dietary services. 
5
 The only known similar study is Tan (2011), which uses Taiwan nonprofit hospital data to investigate the role of 
religion on one type of financial reporting manipulation: accruals-based earnings management. 
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measure of earnings management is estimated by replicating and extending the work of Leone 
and Van Horn (2005).  Contractual allowances are estimates of the difference between gross 
billings (at undiscounted rates) and amounts received or receivable from third-party payors with 
formal contract agreements.  Although this account is based on anticipated reimbursement as 
calculated under formal contracts, determining an accurate estimate is difficult due to the 
inherent complexity of the agreements, timing of payments, volume of transactions, and 
variability among payors.  This provides hospital managers with a considerable amount of 
discretion over reported contractual allowances.  As a result, this account is generally viewed to 
be the most significant risk area for audit firms.
6
  With respect to classification management, 
charity care as a percentage of uncompensated care is used to test the second hypothesis.
7
   
This research uses publicly available data for nonprofit hospitals from fiscal years 2002 
through 2012 collected by the Office of Statewide Health Planning & Development (“OSHPD”) 
of the state of California.  The primary analyses use quarterly data because they allow for a more 
powerful measure of management’s intent to mislead stakeholders and provide insight into the 
timing of potential manipulation.  The decision to use quarterly data is also motivated by 
research that documents the prevalence of fourth-quarter manipulation (e.g. Jeter and 
Shivakumar 1999; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Das et al. 2009; Fan et al. 2010).  Given that this study 
focuses on differential financial reporting behavior of secular and religious hospitals, the fourth 
quarter provides a powerful additional setting for data analysis.  
Findings 
 Using multiple empirical proxies for financial reporting manipulation, results from this 
research suggest that religious hospitals manage earnings less than secular hospitals.  This 
                                                 
6
 The author’s previous audit experience and conversations with a Big 4 partner confirm that audit firms spend a 
significant amount of resources to gain assurance regarding a hospital’s estimate of contractual allowances. 
7
 As defined in Appendix 1, uncompensated care represents the sum of a hospital’s charity care and bad debt. 
7 
  
finding can be attributed to the governance role that religious social norms play in deterring 
certain types of unethical reporting behavior.  Although univariate evidence implies that 
religious hospitals may artificially increase their charity to uncompensated care ratio more 
frequently than secular hospitals, regression results are inconsistent with the second hypothesis. 
 Supplemental tests indicate that the earnings management result is being driven by 
differences in the fourth quarter, the period in which manipulation is most likely to occur.  
Subsequent tests also reveal that the biggest difference between secular and religious hospitals 
with respect to earnings management occurs for the Medicaid payor.  However, there is also 
limited evidence that religious hospitals strategically manage contractual allowances for 
Medicare and Third Party payors to a lesser extent than secular hospitals during the fourth 
quarter.   
 During the sample period, new healthcare legislation provided a shock to managers’ 
financial reporting incentives, primarily due to increased reporting requirements for maintaining 
tax-exempt status.  Although overall earnings management appears to be greater after the 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the effect of hospital ownership on financial reporting changed as a result of the 
legislation.   
Contributions 
This study provides important evidence regarding the influence of religion on financial 
reporting behavior.  First, it complements a recent stream of accounting research that focuses on 
the religious characteristics of the location in which a company operates as a proxy for religiosity 
by using a more direct measure, a hospital’s ownership type.  This is important because the 
nonprofit sector, and in particular the healthcare industry, is comprised of numerous 
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organizations that have a strong religious affiliation that transcends the spiritual beliefs of 
individuals in the surrounding geographic area.  Additionally, this research comprehensively 
examines two types of financial reporting manipulation, earnings management and classification 
management, while much of the existing literature examines only one type.  Given that nonprofit 
organizations technically do not have a profit motive, it is important to look at other means of 
manipulation beyond those that affect reported earnings (e.g. charity care manipulation). 
In addition to providing evidence on the influence of religion on two types of financial 
reporting manipulation, another important contribution of this study is that it provides a better 
specified model of earnings management that can be used in future healthcare accounting 
research.  Furthermore, the use of quarterly (unaudited) data allows for a cleaner measure of 
management’s reporting intentions than currently found in the literature because they are less 
subject to auditor adjustment.  In summary, this study provides a more complete picture of the 
role of religious affiliation with respect to the nature, timing, and extent of financial reporting 
decisions made by a relatively under-researched portion of the economy.   
Results from this dissertation have significant implications for a variety of hospital 
stakeholders.  For example, findings from the earnings management analysis provide users (e.g. 
audit firms, tax authorities, various regulatory agencies, potential donors, debt holders, and other 
hospital stakeholders) an important social factor to consider when evaluating the reliability of 
hospital financial statements.  Similarly, findings from the classification management analysis 
inform taxing authorities and other regulators of how the nature of hospital ownership potentially 
influences the timing and extent of unethical reporting activities related to charity care.  Given 
the significant focus on charity care in the nonprofit healthcare sector, these results are of 
particular interest.  As mentioned above, this study also has implications for accounting 
9 
  
researchers by providing an improved hospital-specific model of earnings management, as well 
as additional evidence in support of using quarterly data in studies of financial reporting 
manipulation.  Finally, results from this research may generalize to other large industries within 
the nonprofit sector (e.g. higher education). 
Organization 
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a brief 
discussion of hospital accounting and reporting, as well as a review of the literature related to 
financial reporting manipulation in nonprofit hospitals and the influence of religion on various 
types of corporate behavior.  Chapters 3 and 4 present the methodology used and results of all 
statistical tests.  The dissertation concludes with a discussion in Chapter 5.  
10 
  
II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Introduction 
While there is a significant line of for-profit research on financial reporting manipulation, 
relatively little has been explored in the nonprofit healthcare sector, despite the fact that 
nonprofit hospitals also have incentives to manipulate financial performance.
8
  This section 
provides a brief overview of accounting and reporting in the healthcare industry, describes the 
incentives for nonprofit hospitals to mislead stakeholders and documented evidence of such 
activities, and discusses the influence of religious social norms on various aspects of corporate 
behavior.  More importantly, it develops expectations regarding the influence of religious 
hospital ownership on two types of financial reporting manipulation: earnings management and 
classification management. 
Hospital background 
Background of hospital accounting and reporting 
Unlike most industries, the development of accounting practice in hospitals has been 
largely shaped by the industry itself, rather than accounting standard setters.
9
  The AHA, an 
organization to which nearly every U.S. hospital belongs, was instrumental in the evolution of 
accounting thought, particularly following the 1933 report of the Advisory Committee on 
Accounting.  Later, as more individuals became covered under private and governmental 
insurance plans, third-party payors such as Blue Cross Blue Shield (“BCBS”) and Medicare 
                                                 
8
 For example, see Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Xu et al. (2007) for a review of the accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management literature, respectively. 
9
 See Flesher and Pridgen (2014) for a more complete discussion of the development of hospital accounting. 
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became increasingly relevant in the development of hospital accounting, especially in the area of 
cost reimbursement (Flesher and Pridgen 2014).  Currently, the AHA and the Healthcare 
Financial Management Association (“HFMA”) provide assistance on technical accounting issues 
in conjunction with the industry’s two primary standard setters: the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(“FASB”). 
With respect to statutory reporting, individual states have the authority to require the 
nature, timing, and extent of any additional hospital reports.  As a result, there is considerable 
variation in reporting requirements among states.  Specific to the state of California, OSHPD 
requires all hospitals (i.e. for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental) to submit detailed quarterly 
and annual reports that conform to the Accounting & Reporting Manual for California Hospitals.  
An excerpt from the current reporting manual is below: 
The accounting principles and concepts incorporated in this manual are based on 
the Proposed Audit and Accounting Guide "Audits of Providers of Health Care 
Services", March 15, 1988, prepared by the Health Care Committee and the 
Health Care Audit Guide Task Force for the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants and it should be referenced for guidance on principles and 
concepts not covered in this manual.  Although they are not included in this 
Manual, the accounting principles and concepts recommended in the Opinions of 
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants should serve as reference sources for specific questions on 
accounting policies and concepts.  Furthermore, pronouncements by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board should also be reflected in the hospital's accounting 
policies and concepts, as appropriate.  This Manual published by the Office shall 
be the official and binding interpretation of accounting and reporting treatment 
within the hospital accounting and reporting system and shall take precedence 
over the AICPA Hospital Audit and Accounting Guide.
10
 
 
These reports, first required for the 1976/1977 state fiscal year, contain detailed utilization and 
financial data for individual hospitals and are published on the OSHPD website following a brief 
desk audit.   
                                                 
10
 The manual can be found at the OSHPD website (http://www.oshpd.ca.gov). 
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Provision of charity care 
In 1946, Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (commonly known 
as the Hill-Burton Act) in an effort to expand access to healthcare, particularly in the rural South.  
In exchange for federal grants, hospitals were required to provide a “reasonable volume” of free 
care to the poor (i.e. charity care).  As of December 19, 2013, a total of 161 facilities in the U.S. 
were still required to comply with the Hill-Burton provisions.  Of this total, 15 are located in 
California, but only two are general acute care hospitals (www.hrsa.gov).  Although the Hill-
Burton provisions have expired for many hospitals, charity care remains a key focus for 
nonprofit hospitals and regulators.  Certain individual states also have laws that dictate required 
levels of charity care.  For example, since 1993 Texas has required nonprofit hospitals to spend 
at least 4% of net patient revenue on free or discounted care (Kennedy et al. 2010).  While 
California currently has no such requirement, the provision of charity care is a highly scrutinized 
element of performance, especially for renewals of tax-exempt status. 
Recent changes to nonprofit hospital regulatory environment 
As discussed in more detail below, nonprofit hospitals have faced increasing scrutiny 
regarding their tax-exempt status in recent years.  As a result, regulatory reporting requirements 
have changed in an effort to improve transparency, particularly with respect to the level of 
charitable activities.  The single biggest change in recent years was the passage of the ACA in 
2010.  For the purposes of this study, the ACA is significant because it increases the visibility of 
hospital performance and the requirements for hospitals to maintain tax-exempt status (U.S. 
Congress 2010)
11
.  The most noteworthy element with respect to financial reporting is the 
                                                 
11
 See Smith and Noe (2012) for a summary of the new reporting requirements for nonprofit hospitals to maintain 
tax-exempt status. 
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requirement to submit audited financial statements with Form 990 for tax years beginning after 
March 23, 2010
12
. 
Earnings management in nonprofit hospitals 
Due to the unique nature of the healthcare industry, hospital managers are faced with 
competing institutional and regulatory pressures that drive desired reported performance in 
opposite directions.  Even though nonprofit organizations lack a true profit motive, hospitals do 
have incentives to increase reported profits, especially to avoid a loss.  Brickley and Van Horn 
(2002) show that both CEO turnover and compensation in hospitals are highly correlated with 
financial performance.  Specifically, CEO turnover is higher when performance is poor.  
Eldenburg et al. (2004) find a similar relationship between CEO turnover and financial 
performance using a sample of California hospitals.  Results from these two studies lend support 
for the argument that the hospital CEO labor market provides a strong incentive for managers to 
avoid reporting losses (Leone and Van Horn 2005).  Hospitals also face an incentive to show 
stable, positive income to reduce the cost of debt (Trueman and Titman 1988; Leone and Van 
Horn 2005).   
For nonprofit hospitals, however, showing large amounts of positive income is not 
always in their best interests.  Reporting high earnings may invite third party payors such as 
governmental programs (i.e. Medicare and Medicaid) and private insurance companies (e.g. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield) to negotiate lower contracted rates (Leone and Van Horn 2005).  Given that 
the vast majority of a hospital’s financial success is tied to these payors, even a small reduction 
in the contracted rate of one or more services could have significant financial consequences.
13
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 If the hospital is part of a multi-facility system, only the financial statements for the consolidated entity must be 
attached. 
13
 Holding volume constant, lower contract rates result in higher contractual allowances and lower reimbursement 
for hospitals. 
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To a lesser extent, nonprofit hospitals also face a constraint on the amount of reported profit 
because of potential donors’ perceptions of hospital need.  Donors may feel less compelled to 
contribute to a hospital that is generating a substantial amount of profit than one that is 
constantly struggling to break even.   
Perhaps the biggest reason why nonprofit hospitals often want to limit reported income is 
that disclosing excess profitability may result in additional regulatory scrutiny that could 
jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the hospital (Leone and Van Horn 2005).  This concern is 
especially timely given the current climate of the healthcare industry.  Several nonprofit hospitals 
have come under fire in the popular press for their outstanding financial performance, lofty 
executive pay, and minimal amounts of charity care being provided to the poor.  Many question 
whether the substantial federal, state, and local income, property, and sales tax breaks these 
hospitals are receiving are justifiable in terms of community benefit.  For example, a recent 
article in the New York Times citing Young et al. (2013) documents this concern over favorable 
tax treatment for highly profitable nonprofits (Rosenthal 2013).  Similarly, a comprehensive joint 
study by The Charlotte Observer and The News & Observer found that many nonprofit hospitals 
in the Charlotte, North Carolina, area generate huge profits and provide little charity care to the 
community, bringing into question the value of tax exemptions (Alexander et al. 2012). 
Similar to the earnings distribution documented in the for-profit sector (e.g. Hayn 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999), Leone and Van Horn (2005) find that U.S. 
nonprofit hospitals use discretionary contractual allowances (“DCA”) to manipulate profits 
toward zero and to avoid a loss.
14
   Ballantine et al. (2007) replicate these findings using a 
                                                 
14
 Other research in the healthcare sector (e.g. Hoerger 1991; Leone and Van Horn 2005; Eldenburg et al. 2011) has 
shown that nonprofit hospitals also manage earnings through real activities.  For example, Eldenburg et al. (2011) 
find that hospitals with strong pay-for-performance incentives manage expenditures in non-operating and non-
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sample of hospitals in the United Kingdom.  Further, Vansant (2013) shows that the level of 
DCA in a hospital is a function of the level of charity care, a primary driver of tax-exempt status.  
That is, hospitals with favorable levels of charity care are less likely to artificially decrease 
reported income through contractual allowances to avoid potential scrutiny from taxing 
authorities or other third parties.  Similarly, these high-charity hospitals are more likely to use 
contractual allowances to increase reported income above a small profit benchmark.  However, 
these results are based on the assumption that charity care is not being manipulated.  This study 
examines this critical assumption of Vansant (2013) by showing to what extent secular and 
religious hospitals manipulate performance through both earnings manipulation and charity care 
classification.   
This research focuses on differences between secular and religious hospitals using all 
quarters and when manipulation is most likely to occur, the fourth quarter.  Some studies in 
accounting have shown that quarterly data can provide interesting evidence regarding the extent 
and timing of reporting manipulation.  For example, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999, 318) find that 
“managers exhibit the greatest evidence of earnings management in the last quarter of a fiscal 
year.”  Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2004) show that firms manage tax expense in the fourth quarter 
to beat earnings forecasts.  However, as Das et al. (2009) illustrate, earnings management 
activities are not always biased upward in the fourth quarter.  In fact, many firms reduce income 
in the last quarter to be able to report smooth earnings.  Together, these findings provide 
researchers with a motivation to use quarterly reports, especially fourth-quarter data, when 
comparing manipulation activities between groups.   
                                                                                                                                                             
revenue-generating activities to show a small profit.  They also find that hospitals strategically dispose of assets to 
avoid showing excess profits.   
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As discussed previously, nonprofit hospitals face a wide variety of pressures that provide 
a motive for unethical financial reporting behavior.  While external stakeholders (e.g. auditors, 
regulators, etc.) constrain such behavior to a degree, religious norms may provide an intrinsic 
mechanism through which manipulation is deterred.  However, defining these norms is difficult 
and subject to substantial measurement error.  In this study, religious norms are measured 
according to hospital ownership type (i.e. secular vs. religious) rather than the hospital’s 
geographic location.  This study contends that religious ownership is a more direct measure of 
religiosity than previously used in the literature because of the strong social ties associated with 
working for a religious organization.  As discussed previously, many nonprofit hospitals have a 
strong religious affiliation that has widespread effects above and beyond the religiosity of 
individuals within a given geographic area. 
Research in the accounting and finance disciplines has explored the influence of religion 
on various aspects of corporate behavior.  For example, Hilary and Hui (2009) find that firms 
located in highly religious counties appear to be more conservative with investment decisions 
and exhibit less growth due to risk aversion.  A related study shows that the nature of local 
religious beliefs (i.e. Catholic vs. Protestant) influences the investment behavior of mutual fund 
managers (Shu et al. 2012).  Specifically, they find that mutual funds headquartered in 
predominantly Catholic regions exhibit greater volatility than those in mainly Protestant regions.  
The relationship between religion and risk avoidance is also documented by Omer et al. (2013), 
who find that non-Big 4 audit firms in more religious areas issue more going concern audit 
opinions.  The authors attribute this finding to auditors in religious locations being more averse 
to litigation risk.   
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The accounting literature shows that religious norms also have an effect on corporate tax 
behavior and equity valuation.  For example, Dyreng et al. (2012) and Boone et al. (2013) find 
that firms located in highly religious areas tend to exhibit lower incidences of tax avoidance.  
Further, El Ghoul et al. (2012) show that firms located in highly religious counties benefit from a 
lower cost of equity capital.  Their results are strongest for firms with low external monitoring, 
suggesting that religion has a governance function as discussed below. 
Most relevant to this study, a related stream of literature has focused on the impact of 
religion on financial reporting decisions.  While Callen et al. (2011) find no relationship between 
religiosity and earnings management in a cross-country setting, two recent studies show that the 
nature and extent of religious affiliation within a firm’s geographic region can serve as an 
alternate corporate governance mechanism.  Consistent with social norm theory, which suggests 
that individuals modify their behavior to conform with what they perceive others deem as 
acceptable behavior (Kohlberg 1984), Dyreng et al. (2012) and McGuire et al. (2012) find that 
firms in highly religious areas have less accruals-based financial reporting irregularities.  
Interestingly, these firms are also more likely to voluntarily disclose bad news (Dyreng et al. 
2012), yet exhibit higher levels of real earnings management (McGuire et al. 2012).  The finding 
is likely driven by the perception that managing income through real activities is acceptable since 
it is within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles (Graham et al. 2005).  
Swenson (2012) also documents the importance of religion in a financial reporting context, 
finding that firms headquartered in areas of Western religion dominance (e.g. Christianity, Islam, 
and Judaism) are more conservative than those in areas of primarily Eastern religions (e.g. 
Buddhism and Hinduism). 
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While religious norms in an individual’s environment may influence the way a person 
behaves, the extent to which religiosity may affect financial reporting decisions depends on a 
variety of factors.  Given that earnings management is generally viewed as the most unethical 
and risky form of financial reporting manipulation (Graham et al. 2005), religious norms are 
expected to be particularly effective in deterring earnings management activities.  Consistent 
with social norm theory and the results of Dyreng et al. (2012) and McGuire et al. (2012), this 
study predicts that religious hospitals exhibit lower incidences of earnings management than 
secular hospitals.  This prediction is formally stated below: 
H1: Managers in religious hospitals engage in less earnings management than those in 
secular hospitals. 
 
Classification management in nonprofit hospitals 
Without a true profit motive, hospital managers also have incentives to manipulate 
financial performance without changing reported income by shifting certain costs to improve key 
metrics.  As Krishnan and Yetman (2011) show, one specific way that a nonprofit organization 
can mislead stakeholders without directly manipulating income is by shifting costs to improve 
their PSR.  The PSR is an important measure of a nonprofit’s efficiency and is highly scrutinized 
by potential donors, regulators, and other stakeholders.  In the case of a hospital, this involves 
reclassifying costs to patient care from non-patient care to appear more efficient.  Interestingly, 
they show that religious hospitals engage in more cost shifting behavior because they face 
greater normative pressures to show efficiency than secular hospitals.  For example, religious 
hospitals often face constraints (e.g. not being able to provide a controversial, yet profitable 
service such as abortions) that secular hospitals do not.  At the same time, religious hospitals are 
held to the same performance standards as secular nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, thereby 
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providing a motive to manipulate results.  It is unclear, however, whether their results will hold 
using other measures of classification management. 
In addition to the PSR, hospitals may shift other expenses to make key financial ratios 
appear more favorable.  Given the focus on uncompensated care in the healthcare industry, bad 
debt expense and charity care expense are two common candidates for reclassification.  Bad debt 
and charity care expense are separately disclosed in the financial statements and represent 
amounts for which the hospital does not expect to receive cash.  While bad debt relates to 
patients that are unwilling to pay, charity care relates to patients that are unable to pay.  A 
distinction between the two must be made at the time of service (i.e. not during the collection 
process) using the hospital’s formal charity guidelines, which are designed to assess a patient’s 
ability to pay.  Generally, this determination is final unless it was erroneous.  While hospitals 
actively pursue collection of amounts classified as bad debt, they are prohibited from pursuing 
collection of amounts classified as charity care.  Thus, there is a potentially substantial cost to 
reclassifying bad debt expense as charity care since any future collection is foregone.
15
     
In addition to reported income, nonprofit hospitals also face a considerable amount of 
scrutiny regarding their level of charity care since it is a key driver of tax exempt status.
16
  
Wilkicki (2001) provides experimental evidence that both factors, the levels of profitability and 
charity care, contribute to perceptions of tax-exempt status.  With respect to the latter, the Illinois 
Supreme Court recently upheld the 2004 revocation of tax-exempt status of Catholic-owned 
Provena Covenant Medical Center for providing insufficient care to indigent patients.  
                                                 
15
 See Eldenburg and Vines (2004) for further discussion of the difference between bad debt and charity care 
expense. 
16
 Barniv et al. (2005) find that only three nonprofit hospitals in California pay any state or local taxes.  
Consequently, the vast majority have strong incentives to show high levels of charitable activities to maintain tax-
exempt status. 
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Furthermore, the state of Illinois has challenged the property tax exemptions of three additional 
hospitals for failing to provide adequate charity care (Japsen 2011). 
As a result of this increased scrutiny, hospitals have a strong incentive to shift costs from 
bad debt expense to charity care expense.  This incentive is particularly strong when a hospital’s 
current cash levels are high because they are in a better financial position to forgo collectability 
of revenue classified as charity care.  Using a proprietary database of Florida hospitals, 
Eldenburg and Vines (2004) find evidence that hospitals with large amounts of available cash, 
especially those that are performing poorly, tend to reclassify costs from bad debt to charity care 
more often than those with little cash.  This result is not surprising since high cash hospitals are 
in a better position to give up potential collectability in exchange for better charity care ratios.  
Because of the difficulty in estimating bad debt and charity care and the fact that the hospital’s 
income is unchanged, hospital managers may see this type of manipulation as less egregious than 
earnings management. 
If shifting costs from bad debt to charity care is viewed to be more acceptable by hospital 
managers, then religious norms may not be effective at deterring classification management.  
Further, as a result of their spiritual missions, religious hospitals may feel more pressure to show 
high levels of charity care to appeal to their religious stakeholders.  Classification management 
behavior may be especially prevalent in religious hospitals if earnings management activities are 
constrained by religious norms as hypothesized in H1 above.  Therefore, higher levels of 
classification management are expected in religious hospitals than in secular hospitals.  The 
second hypothesis is formally stated below: 
H2: Managers in religious hospitals engage in more classification management than those 
in secular hospitals. 
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Summary of relevant literature 
In summary, the CEO labor market and the cost of debt motivate nonprofit hospital 
managers to artificially increase the amount of reported profit.  However, increased scrutiny 
from taxing authorities, potential donors, and other third party payors necessitate the moderation 
of reported income (Trueman and Titman 1988; Leone and Van Horn 2005).  Recent evidence 
demonstrates that managers do manipulate earnings to a small profit benchmark (Leone and Van 
Horn 2005; Ballantine et al. 2007), as well as engage in various types of classification shifting 
activities in response to these incentives.  For example, Krishnan and Yetman (2011) find 
evidence that managers shift costs to improve their PSR.  Similarly, Eldenburg and Vines (2004) 
show that nonprofit managers also engage in classification shifting to appear more charitable, 
particularly when cash levels are high. 
Additionally, research has shown that religion can influence various corporate behaviors, 
including the types of financial reporting manipulation documented above.  For example, the 
nature and extent of religiosity has been shown to be a major factor in decisions regarding 
investment (Hilary and Hui 2009; Shu et al. 2012), going concern reporting (Omer et al. 2013), 
and tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2012; Boone et al. 2013).  Most relevant to this study is that 
religion has also been linked to financial reporting decisions (Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 
2012; Swenson 2012).  However, this line of research has not yet considered the influence of 
religion on financial reporting in the nonprofit healthcare sector, a substantial portion of the U.S. 
economy.
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample 
This study uses publicly available data collected by OSHPD of the state of California.  
California provides a fairly representative sample of the U.S. hospital population because of its 
large size, ownership variation, and socio-economic diversity.  All hospitals in the state are 
required to submit standard reports containing detailed utilization and financial information to 
OSHPD after each quarter and fiscal year end.  In addition to any scrutiny from external auditors, 
these reports are also subject to a desk audit by OSHPD staff before they are published on the 
OSHPD website.   
Unlike most research in the nonprofit sector, the primary analyses in this study focus on 
quarterly rather than annual data.  Since quarterly data is reported on the OSHPD website on a 
calendar year basis, data is converted to fiscal quarters such that the fourth quarter corresponds to 
the last quarter in the hospital’s fiscal year.  A significant problem with using annual data to 
detect financial reporting manipulation is that it results in a joint test of management’s reporting 
behavior and the auditor’s response.  One of the biggest advantages of using quarterly data is 
that, because these reports are not audited, they provide a purer measure of management’s 
reporting intent.
17
  Additionally, quarterly data provide important insight into the timing of 
                                                 
17
 Although quarterly reports are not audited by the external auditor, they are subject to a cursory review by OSHPD 
prior to being released on their website.  While this review process could potentially deter some financial reporting 
manipulation, it is the same for all hospitals and, therefore, not expected to differentially affect secular and religious 
hospitals. 
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manipulation.  The time period for this study encompasses quarterly and annual reports from 
fiscal years ending June 30, 2002 through June 29, 2012.
18
   
Table 1 provides detail of the H1 and H2 regression samples.  For meaningful statistical 
analyses, only comparable hospitals as defined by OSHPD are included.  Specifically, the H1 
sample excludes for-profit (6,393) and government (4,745) hospitals, all Kaiser Permanente 
(1,571) and Shriners (109) hospitals because OSHPD grants those facilities reduced reporting 
requirements, and certain hospitals with a specialty focus such as psychiatric (968) and long-term 
care (165).  As discussed later, to ensure a clean sample with proper classification of ownership 
type, 1,097 observations (secular: 881 and religious: 216) pertaining to hospitals with an 
ownership change during the sample period are eliminated.  Finally, a total of 2,810 observations 
(secular: 2,308 and religious: 502) are removed due to missing data required for regression 
analysis.  These eliminations procedures result in a final sample (H1) of 5,529 observations, of 
which 4,942 (89.4%) and 587 (10.6%) correspond to secular and religious hospitals, 
respectively.  A list of the hospitals included in the H1 regression sample is presented in 
Appendix 2. 
In tests of H2, hospitals for which total uncompensated care is comprised entirely of bad 
debt (secular: 526 and religious: 5) or charity care (secular: 119 and religious: 0) are eliminated 
from the sample.  These observations are removed because their charity care ratio is unrealistic 
and never varies (i.e. ratio is always 0% or 100%).  Data requirements for H2 result in a loss of 
219 additional observations (all secular), leaving a total of 4,660 hospital-quarters (secular: 4,078 
and religious: 582) for regression analyses.  
  
                                                 
18
 Quarterly data is reported on the OSHPD website by calendar year, while annual data is reported by state fiscal 
year (June 30 year end).  Annual data begins with the 2002/2003 fiscal year because it is the first year OSHPD 
began publishing data files in Microsoft Excel format. 
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TABLE 1 – SAMPLE COMPOSITION 
 
  Secular Religious Total 
  
% of 
 
% of 
 
  N Total N Total N 
Initial sample 22,082  94.4% 1,305  5.6% 23,387  
Less: 
     
     For-profit (6,393) 100.0%    (6,393) 
     Government (4,745) 100.0%    (4,745) 
     Kaiser (1,571) 100.0%   (1,571) 
     Psychiatric (968) 100.0%    (968) 
     Long-term care (165) 100.0%   (165) 
     Shriners (109) 100.0%    (109) 
     Ownership change (881) 80.3% (216) 19.7% (1,097) 
     Missing data (2,308) 82.1% (502) 17.9% (2,810) 
Final sample (H1) 4,942  89.4% 587  10.6% 5,529  
      
Less: 
     
     No charity care (526) 99.1% (5) 0.9% (531) 
     No bad debt (119) 100.0%    (119) 
     Missing data (219) 100.0%    (219) 
Final sample (H2) 4,078  87.5% 582  12.5% 4,660  
      
Notes: The initial sample shown above contains quarterly data from 2000 to 2013 for all open hospitals in the 
state of California as reported to the Office of Statewide Health Planning & Development (OSHPD). 
   
Regression models 
 As discussed previously, this research tests two hypotheses that address different types of 
financial reporting manipulation: earnings management and classification management.  The 
following sections describe the data analysis procedures and dependent variables used to 
formally test H1 and H2. 
Test of earnings management (H1) 
H1 hypothesizes that religious hospital managers engage in less earnings management 
than secular hospital managers because of strong religious social norms.  To test this hypothesis, 
the following regression model is estimated using all fiscal quarters, as well as separately for the 
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fourth quarter (hospital and quarter subscripts excluded).  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles and standard errors are clustered by hospital.  See 
Appendix 3 for a definition of all variables. 
EM = β0 + β1REL_OWN + β2FQ4 + β3REL_CTY + β4RURAL + β5OP_INC + 
β6CHAR_GR + β7GOV_REV + β8BOD_SIZE + β9GR_REV + β10BEDS + β11EMt-1 
+ YEAR + ε 
 
where:  
EM = empirical proxy for earnings management, measured as either DCA_LV 
or DCA_MLV, as discussed in detail in the following section;  
REL_OWN  = coded 1 if hospital is church owned, 0 otherwise, as discussed in detail 
below; 
FQ4 = coded 1 if fiscal quarter equals 4, 0 otherwise; 
REL_CTY = county-level measure of religious adherence, as collected in 2010 by the 
Association of Religion Data Archives (“ARDA”); 
RURAL  = coded 1 if hospital is located in a rural area as defined by OSHPD, 0 
otherwise; 
OP_INC  = operating income for the first three fiscal quarters, scaled by total assets 
from previous year; 
CHAR_GR  = charity care as a percentage of total gross revenue; 
GOV_REV = sum of Medicare and Medicaid gross revenue as a percentage of total 
gross revenue; 
BOD_SIZE  = number of hospital board members (in hundreds);  
GR_REV  = total gross patient revenue, scaled by total assets from previous year; 
BEDS = number of staffed beds (in hundreds); and 
YEAR = year dummy variables. 
Since the first hypothesis examines differences in earnings management between secular 
and religious hospitals, the variable of interest is REL_OWN.  Given that social norm theory 
predicts religious hospitals manage earnings to a lesser extent than secular hospitals, a negative 
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coefficient for β1 would provide support for H1.  FQ4 is included to better understand the timing 
of when earnings management is taking place and because prior research (e.g. Jeter and 
Shivakumar 1999; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Das et al. 2009) shows that earnings management occurs 
more in the fourth fiscal quarter.  If so, then β2 will be positive.   
Since prior research (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012) has shown that the 
extent of religiosity within a particular geographic location may deter financial reporting 
manipulation, the model includes REL_CTY as a control, with β3 expected to be negative.  The 
model also includes RURAL to control for the fact that rural hospitals may be more conservative 
with financial reporting decisions (McGuire et al. 2012).  If this is the case, β4 will be negative. 
To control for various financial pressures to manipulate earnings, OP_INC, CHAR_GR, 
and GOV_REV are also included.  As defined above, OP_INC captures operating income for the 
previous three fiscal quarters and prior research has shown that past performance is associated 
with current accruals (Kothari et al. 2005).  In the nonprofit healthcare sector, if earnings are low 
during this time period, managers may have an incentive to decrease contractual allowances to 
increase reported income.  Conversely, if earnings are high, managers may increase contractual 
allowances to reduce income and avoid additional scrutiny.  Since DCA_LV and DCA_MLV are 
both unsigned as discussed later, β5 is expected to be positive.   
The results of Vansant (2013) advocate the inclusion of CHAR_GR.  Specifically, he 
finds that hospitals are more aggressive with earnings management techniques when reported 
charity care levels exceed expectations.  Thus, the coefficient on CHAR_GR (β6) should be 
positive.  The nature and extent of revenue concentration may also be an important factor in 
potential manipulation.  Since reimbursement is typically lower for Medicare and Medicaid 
patients, hospitals with high levels of GOV_REV may face greater pressure to manage earnings 
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to appear competitive.  On the other hand, this variable may also be viewed as a measure of 
regulatory scrutiny, which may deter financial reporting manipulation.  For example, Krishnan 
and Yetman (2011) find that hospitals with a high Medicare to total gross revenue ratio shift 
costs less than those with a low ratio.  Consequently, no directional prediction is made for β7. 
Corporate governance is another factor that may affect a hospital’s ability to manipulate 
performance.  Therefore, a variable that captures the number of board members, BOD_SIZE, is 
used as a control.  Prior research (e.g. Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996; Cheng et al. 2008; Krishnan 
and Yetman 2011) suggests that excessively large boards, common in the nonprofit sector, may 
actually weaken the monitoring function.  Therefore, a positive sign is hypothesized for β8. 
The regression model also includes two measures of size, GR_REV and BEDS.  
Consistent with Krishnan and Yetman (2011), no formal prediction is made regarding the 
direction of either β9 or β10.  Finally, either DCA_LVt-1 or DCA_MLVt-1 is included to control for 
potential autocorrelation in the level of DCA following Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Vansant 
(2013).  Therefore, β11 should be positive. 
Test of classification management (H2) 
H2 posits that religious hospitals engage in more classification management than secular 
hospitals because of various institutional and social constraints juxtaposed with substantial 
normative pressures to show high levels of charity care.  The same model used in H1 is used as 
an initial test of H2 with the following exceptions: the dependent variable is a proxy for 
classification management and the addition of a variable for cash availability.  Excluding 
REL_CTY, all other directional predictions for control variables are the same as previously 
discussed.  For H2, REL_CTY is expected to have a positive coefficient.  This modified model, 
which is estimated for all quarters and separately for the fourth quarter, is below (hospital and 
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quarter subscripts excluded).  As an additional approach to analyzing H2, a similar logistic 
regression model is also estimated in which the dependent variable equals either CHAR_UP or 
CHAR_UP3Q.  All variables are defined in Appendix 3. 
CM = β0 + β1REL_OWN + β2FQ4 + β3REL_CTY + β4RURAL + β5OP_INC + 
β6CHAR_GR + β7GOV_REV + β8BOD_SIZE + β9GR_REV + β10BEDS + β11CASH 
+ β12CMt-1 + YEAR + ε 
 
where:  
CM = empirical proxy for classification management, measured as either 
CHAR_UN or CHAR_UN3Q, as discussed in detail in the following 
section; 
CASH  = days cash on hand, measured following Eldenburg and Vines (2004) as: 
(cash + marketable securities + unrestricted investments)/[(total expense 
– depreciation)/365]. 
Similar to the test of H1, REL_OWN is the variable of interest in the classification 
management models above.  Therefore, H2 is supported if β1 is positive.  A positive coefficient 
for FQ4 (β2) would support the assertion that classification management occurs more in the 
fourth quarter (Fan et al. 2010).  CASH is added to the classification management model because 
Eldenburg and Vines (2004) have shown that cash levels affect the decision to reclassify bad 
debt costs as charity care.  Specifically, high cash hospitals reclassify more than low cash 
hospitals.  Consequently, β11 is hypothesized to be positive.  Finally, consistent with Leone and 
Van Horn (2005) and Vansant (2013), CMt-1 is included as a control for autocorrelation with β12 
expected to be positive.   
Independent variable 
 As discussed above, the variable of interest in this study is whether the nonprofit hospital 
is owned by a secular or religious entity (secular: REL_OWN = 0, religious: REL_OWN = 1).  
This information is self-reported by hospitals on a quarterly and annual basis, along with other 
descriptive, financial, and utilization data.  To classify hospital ownership as secular or religious, 
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this study relies on the quarterly OSHPD reports since the main analyses use quarterly data.  
While the annual reports disclose nonprofit secular/religious ownership on an annual basis, the 
quarterly reports did not make this distinction until 2013.  To address this issue, the ownership 
type listed during 2013 (or the last year the facility was open) is used as the secular/religious 
classification (REL_OWN) of all prior quarters.  This approach implicitly makes two 
assumptions: 1) the classification during 2013 is correct, and 2) ownership type for a given 
hospital is constant throughout the sample period.  While there is no reason to believe that 
reported 2013 data would be inaccurate, this assumption is tested by comparing quarterly to 
annual data as discussed later in robustness tests. 
With respect to the second assumption, a review of annual reports reveals that hospital 
ownership type occasionally changes, but that the changes are not always accurately reflected in 
the data.  To ensure the most accurate classification of REL_OWN, all observations related to 
hospitals with a change in ownership type during the sample period, as determined using the 
annual reports, are removed from the analysis.  This process eliminates 1,097 observations and 
results in a smaller, but cleaner sample that consists entirely of facilities with the same ownership 
type throughout the sample period. 
Dependent variables 
 This section discusses the dependent variables used in tests of earnings management (H1) 
and classification management (H2). 
Earnings management (H1) 
Two empirical proxies for earnings management are estimated to test H1 following the 
methodology used by Leone and Van Horn (2005).  Their model is industry specific in that it 
focuses on a hospital’s estimate of contractual allowances, which is one of the greatest areas for 
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potential manipulation due to the size, nature, and complexity of the account.  McNichols (2000) 
champions the use of industry-specific accruals in detecting earnings management, stating that 
“the specific accruals approach may be profitably applied to study other industries for which 
discretion is likely to be concentrated in a single or small number of accruals.”  Historically, the 
bulk of earnings management research using specific accruals has focused on either the banking 
(e.g. Beaver et al. 1989; Collins et al. 1995; Beaver and Engel 1996) or insurance (e.g. Petroni 
1992; Beaver and McNichols 1998; Beaver et al. 2003) industries.   
Shown below, the Leone and Van Horn (2005) approach models the change in total 
contractual allowances as a function of the changes in total gross revenue, Medicare gross 
revenue, and Medicaid gross revenue.  As discussed previously, contractual allowances are 
estimates of the difference between gross billings (at undiscounted rates) and amounts received 
or receivable from third-party payors with formal contract agreements.  Since contractual 
allowances are deductions to arrive at net patient revenue presented on the income statement, the 
model may be viewed as a healthcare-specific modification of the discretionary revenue model 
presented by Stubben (2010).
19
  He shows that discretionary revenue models are more accurate 
in detecting earnings management than a variety of traditional accruals models.  The Leone and 
Van Horn (“LV”) model is estimated by year to allow for structural changes to contracted 
reimbursement rates over the sample period (hospital and quarter subscripts excluded).  The 
residual from this model serves as the first dependent variable (DCA_LV) in tests of H1.   
ΔCA = β0 + β1ΔGR_TOTAL + β2ΔGR_MCARE + β3ΔGR_MCAID + ε 
where:  
ΔCA = change in total contractual allowances, scaled by total assets from 
previous year; 
 
                                                 
19
 See Appendix 4 for John Muir Medical Center’s quarterly report for the period ending December 31, 2012. 
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ΔGR_TOTAL = change in total gross revenue, scaled by total assets from previous year; 
 
ΔGR_MCARE = change in Medicare gross revenue, scaled by total assets from previous 
year; and 
 
ΔGR_MCAID = change in Medicaid gross revenue, scaled by total assets from previous 
year. 
 
 A potential issue with the Leone and Van Horn (2005) model is that it does not separately 
control for changes in gross revenue other than Medicare and Medicaid.  As shown in Table 2, 
revenue related to other third party payors comprises 35.8% (49.7%) of the total gross (net) 
patient revenue.  On average, additional payors combined only represent 5.7% of a hospital’s 
gross revenue.  To reduce the potential for misspecification of DCA, the change in Third Party 
gross revenue (GR_THIRD) is added to the Leone and Van Horn (2005) model.  This 
specification is referred to as the Modified Leone and Van Horn (“MLV”) model.  The MLV 
model uses 94.3% of the total gross revenue in estimating DCA.  Similar to above, the residual 
from this model serves as the second dependent variable (DCA_MLV) in tests of H1.  
In both models above, the residual is used as the proxy for earnings management.  These 
residuals represent the portion of the quarterly change in contractual allowances that is not 
explained by changes in gross revenue within each major payor category (i.e. the discretionary 
change in contractual allowances).  Since the primary focus of this research is on the differential 
behavior of secular and religious hospitals and not the direction of reporting manipulation, the 
absolute values of the residuals are used.  This allows for the magnitude of all earnings 
management behavior to be captured.   
Classification management (H2) 
Based on the work of Eldenburg and Vines (2004), a total of four proxies for 
classification management are used to test H2.  The first dependent measure (CHAR_UN) is the 
32 
  
quarterly change in charity care as a percentage of total uncompensated care, measured as the 
current quarter minus the previous quarter.  Alternatively, the change is also calculated as the 
current quarter minus the average of the previous three quarters (CHAR_UN3Q).  This 
alternative version is especially useful when the sample is restricted to the fourth quarter.  
Dichotomous versions of these two continuous variables are also used in logistic regressions.  
Specifically, CHAR_UP is coded 1 if CHAR_UN is greater than 0 and coded 0 otherwise.  The 
same coding scheme is used for CHAR_UP3Q (i.e. CHAR_UP3Q = 1 if CHAR_UN3Q is greater 
than 0).  
   
3
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TABLE 2 – REVENUE BY MAJOR PAYOR CATEGORY 
 
  Gross Revenue   Deductions   Net Revenue 
Payor Type Mean ($) 
% of   
Gross 
(Total)   Mean ($) 
% of 
Deduct. 
(Total) 
% of   
Gross 
(Payor)   Mean ($) 
% of      
Net   
(Total) 
% of   
Gross 
(Payor) 
Medicare 71,636,625  38.9% 
 
56,495,208  42.0% 78.9% 
 
15,141,418  30.5% 21.1% 
Medicaid 36,113,979  19.6% 
 
28,304,935  21.0% 78.4% 
 
7,809,045  15.7% 21.6% 
Third Party 65,992,485  35.8% 
 
41,270,273  30.7% 62.5% 
 
24,722,212  49.7% 37.5% 
County Indigent 2,629,179  1.4% 
 
2,184,443  1.6% 83.1% 
 
444,736  0.9% 16.9% 
Other Indigent 1,935,190  1.1% 
 
1,755,893  1.3% 90.7% 
 
179,297  0.4% 9.3% 
Other Payors 5,884,591  3.2% 
 
4,461,541  3.3% 75.8% 
 
1,423,050  2.9% 24.2% 
Total 184,192,049  100.0%   134,472,293  100.0% 73.0%   49,719,758  100.0% 27.0% 
           
Notes: This table presents hospital mean amounts (n = 5,529) of gross revenue, deductions from gross revenue, and net revenue by major payor category. 
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IV. RESULTS
This section provides descriptive data for the sample, as well as univariate and multiple 
regression results from hypotheses testing.  Furthermore, it includes results from supplemental 
tests to provide additional information regarding the relationship between the nature of hospital 
ownership and financial reporting manipulation.  Finally, numerous robustness checks are 
conducted to ensure the validity of inferences. 
Descriptive and univariate results 
Panel A of Table 3 provides key descriptive statistics for the entire sample.  The mean 
(median) value of DCA_LV and DCA_MLV is 0.026 (0.015) and 0.025 (0.015), respectively.  
Both CHAR_UN (0.011) and CHAR_UN3Q (0.016) have a mean greater than zero and 
CHAR_UP and CHAR_UP3Q have median values of one, suggesting that hospitals increase their 
charity to uncompensated care ratio more often than they decrease it.  With respect to control 
variables, hospitals in the sample have the following mean values: REL_CTY (438.071), RURAL 
(0.145), OP_INC (0.018), CHAR_GR (0.014), GOV_REV (0.553), BOD_SIZE (0.157), GR_REV 
(1.119), BEDS (1.891), and CASH (48.297).  Differences in all variables across hospital 
ownership type (i.e. secular vs. religious) are discussed below. 
With respect to H1, a comparison of means in Panel B indicates that secular hospitals 
exhibit statistically higher levels of DCA_LV (secular: 0.026 vs. religious: 0.020, p < .01) and 
DCA_MLV (secular: 0.026 vs. religious: 0.021, p < .01) than religious hospitals, regardless of the 
fiscal quarter.  Similar results are found if the sample is restricted to the fourth quarter (secular: 
0.029 vs. religious: 0.020, p < .01), providing preliminary support for H1.  Contrary to 
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expectations, there does not appear to be a significant difference, overall or in the fourth quarter, 
between secular and religious hospitals for either of the continuous measures of classification 
management (CHAR_UN and CHAR_UN3Q).  However, both CHAR_UP (secular: 0.543 vs. 
religious: 0.623, p < .10) and CHAR_UP3Q (secular: 0.578 vs. religious: 0.658, p < .10) are 
higher in the fourth quarter for religious hospitals as predicted by H2.  
In comparison to secular hospitals, religious facilities are more likely to be located in less 
religious (secular: 440.982 vs. religious: 413.563, p < .01), rural geographic areas (secular: 0.131 
vs. religious: 0.264, p < .01).  Furthermore, religious hospitals have higher levels of operating 
income (secular: 0.016 vs. religious: 0.036, p < .01), more charity as a percentage of gross 
revenue (secular: 0.013 vs. religious: 0.015, p < .01), greater concentrations of governmental 
revenue (secular: 0.547 vs. religious: 0.602, p < .01), and cash availability (secular: 46.519 vs. 
religious: 60.758, p < .01).  They are also larger in terms of board size (secular: 0.156 vs. 
religious: 0.164, p < .01) and the number of staffed beds (secular: 1.848 vs. religious: 2.250, p < 
.01).  However, secular and religious hospitals do not differ statistically in terms of total gross 
revenue.  Similar relationships are found when the sample is restricted to differences in the 
fourth quarter. 
Panel C provides information regarding differences in both dichotomous variables used 
in H2.  As documented above, secular and religious hospitals do not differ with respect to the 
frequency of CHAR_UP or CHAR_UP3Q when the sample includes all quarters.  However, for 
CHAR_UP, 62.3% of religious hospitals report a fourth-quarter increase in the ratio of charity 
care to uncompensated care, compared to only 54.3% of secular hospitals.  This difference is 
significant at the .10 level (Pearson χ2 = 3.371).  Furthermore, when CHAR_UP3Q is used, the 
discrepancy increases to 65.8% (religious) vs. 57.8% (secular) and is also significant at the .10 
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level (Pearson χ2 = 3.313).  Collectively, the results in Panels B and C provide limited univariate 
evidence that religious hospitals may artificially inflate their fourth-quarter charity ratio to a 
greater extent than secular hospitals. 
TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable N Mean SD Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max 
DCA_LV 5,529  0.026 0.033 0.000 0.006 0.015 0.031 0.184 
DCA_MLV 5,529  0.025 0.032 0.000 0.006 0.015 0.031 0.179 
CHAR_UN 4,660  0.011 0.230 -0.793 -0.085 0.002 0.097 0.866 
CHAR_UN3Q 4,653  0.016 0.212 -0.753 -0.075 0.003 0.090 0.828 
CHAR_UP 4,660  0.517 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CHAR_UP3Q 4,653  0.513 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
REL_CTY 5,529  438.071 85.388 208.389 370.730 441.069 531.039 554.279 
RURAL 5,529  0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OP_INC 5,529  0.018 0.131 -0.708 -0.016 0.022 0.069 0.681 
CHAR_GR 5,529  0.014 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.019 0.092 
GOV_REV 5,529  0.553 0.183 0.000 0.497 0.593 0.658 0.944 
BOD_SIZE 5,529  0.157 0.057 0.010 0.120 0.150 0.190 0.300 
GR_REV 5,529  1.119 0.667 0.140 0.652 1.004 1.455 5.431 
BEDS 5,529  1.891 1.451 0.120 0.700 1.550 2.720 6.530 
CASH 4,660  48.297 70.600 0.000 3.128 20.410 62.542 406.723 
 
PANEL B: SECULAR VS. RELIGIOUS COMPARISON OF MEANS 
 FQ = ALL  FQ = 4  
Variable Secular Religious Diff.  Secular Religious Diff.  
DCA_LV 0.026 0.020 0.006 *** 0.029 0.020 0.009 *** 
DCA_MLV 0.026 0.021 0.005 *** 0.029 0.020 0.009 *** 
CHAR_UN 0.010 0.015 -0.005   0.045 0.050 -0.005   
CHAR_UN3Q 0.015 0.018 -0.003   0.059 0.058 0.001   
CHAR_UP 0.514 0.534 -0.020   0.543 0.623 -0.080 * 
CHAR_UP3Q 0.510 0.534 -0.024   0.578 0.658 -0.080 * 
REL_CTY 440.982 413.563 27.419 *** 440.695 414.007 26.688 ** 
RURAL 0.131 0.264 -0.133 *** 0.131 0.260 -0.129 *** 
OP_INC 0.016 0.036 -0.020 *** 0.015 0.037 -0.022 *** 
CHAR_GR 0.013 0.015 -0.002 *** 0.016 0.018 -0.002 * 
GOV_REV 0.547 0.602 -0.055 *** 0.546 0.604 -0.058 *** 
BOD_SIZE 0.156 0.164 -0.008 *** 0.156 0.164 -0.008 ** 
GR_REV 1.123 1.085 0.038   1.130 1.114 0.016   
BEDS 1.848 2.250 -0.403 *** 1.841 2.252 -0.411 *** 
CASH 46.519 60.758 -14.239 *** 46.557 60.829 -14.272 ** 
 
 
(continued on next page)  
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TABLE 3 - CONTINUED 
 
PANEL C: FREQUENCIES (CHAR_UP/CHAR_UP3Q) 
 FQ = ALL  FQ = 4 
CHAR_UP Secular Religious Total  Secular Religious Total 
= 0 1,982 271 2,253  468 55 523 
 (48.6) (46.6) (48.3)  (45.7) (37.7) (44.7) 
= 1 2,096 311 2,407  555 91 646 
 (51.4) (53.4) (51.7)  (54.3) (62.3) (55.3) 
Total 4,078 582 4,660  1,023 146 1,169 
        
Pearson χ2 = 0.848    3.371*   
        
 FQ = ALL  FQ = 4 
CHAR_UP3Q Secular Religious Total  Secular Religious Total 
= 0 1,993 271 2,264  431 50 481 
 (49.0) (46.6) (48.7)  (42.2) (34.2) (41.2) 
= 1 2,078 311 2,389  591 96 687 
 (51.0) (53.4) (51.3)  (57.8) (65.8) (58.8) 
Total 4,071 582 4,653  1,022 146 1,168 
        
Pearson χ2 = 1.167    3.313*   
        
Notes: Panel A provides descriptive data for all variables.  Panel B presents results of t-tests (unequal variance 
assumed) between secular and religious hospitals for all variables.  Panel C lists frequencies of CHAR_UP and 
CHAR_UP3Q and tests for differences between secular and religious hospitals.  Percentages are listed in 
parentheses below the frequencies.  See Appendix 3 for variable definitions.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively (two-tailed tests except for χ2). 
 
Table 4 lists Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlation 
coefficients for all variables.  Correlations that are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels are 
displayed in italics, boldface, and boldface/italics, respectively.  As hypothesized, the Pearson 
correlations between REL_OWN and both proxies of earnings management are negative and 
significant at the .01 level (DCA_LV: -.057, DCA_MLV: -.052).  The equivalent Spearman 
correlations are also negative and significant (DCA_LV: -.046, DCA_MLV: -.033).  These 
findings provide univariate evidence in support of H1. 
With respect to classification management, the Pearson correlations between REL_OWN 
and both continuous measures are positive, but not statistically significant (CHAR_UN: .012 , 
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CHAR_UN3Q: .014).  However, correlations between REL_OWN and the two dichotomous 
measures of classification management are both positive and significant at the .01 level 
(CHAR_UP: .052, CHAR_UP3Q: .054).  The corresponding Spearman correlations are similar to 
those above. 
 As shown in Table 4, DCA_LV and DCA_MLV are also negatively correlated (Pearson) 
with OP_INC (-.029 and -.024), BOD_SIZE (-.079 and -.081), BEDS (-.128 and -.128), and 
CASH (-.138 and -.136).  On the other hand, they are both positively correlated with FQ4 (.053 
and .057), RURAL (.047 and .055), CHAR_GR (.076 and .084), GOV_REV (.044 and .054), and 
GR_REV (.367 and .364). 
Regression results 
Results from the DCA estimation procedures are shown in Table 5.  The purpose of these 
models is to develop two proxies for earnings management based on DCA.  Specifically, the LV 
model regresses the change in total contractual allowances (CA) on the changes in total gross 
revenue (GR_TOTAL), Medicare gross revenue (GR_MCARE), and Medicaid gross revenue 
(GR_MCAID).  The MLV model adds the change in Third Party gross revenue (GR_THIRD) as 
an additional explanatory variable.  The models are estimated by year to allow for structural 
changes to contracted reimbursement rates over time.  The absolute values of the residuals from 
the DCA models serve as the dependent variables in tests of H1 below. 
   
3
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TABLE 4 – CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 DCA_LV  .937 -.035 -.020 -.043 -.028 -.046 .033 -.025 .067 .018 .004 .086 -.108 .377 -.159 -.168 
2 DCA_MLV .980  -.040 -.024 -.045 -.023 -.033 .036 -.035 .078 .023 .017 .089 -.100 .369 -.159 -.169 
3 CHAR_UN -.021 -.021  .732 .863 .599 .013 .063 -.017 .002 .010 .180 -.009 .009 -.005 .001 .001 
4 CHAR_UN3Q -.023 -.023 .783  .598 .863 .019 .106 -.016 .003 .014 .243 -.014 .010 .018 .014 .008 
5 CHAR_UP -.054 -.054 .621 .488  .622 .052 .040 -.022 -.018 .043 .281 .047 .022 -.004 .035 .011 
6 CHAR_UP3Q -.046 -.044 .497 .620 .622  .054 .080 -.021 -.018 .043 .346 .040 .022 .020 .051 .022 
7 REL_OWN -.057 -.052 .012 .014 .052 .054  -.001 -.087 .111 .075 .070 .056 .048 -.014 .119 .112 
8 FQ4 .053 .057 .083 .113 .040 .080 -.001  -.001 .000 .003 .070 .001 .000 .011 -.003 .002 
9 REL_CTY .021 .016 -.011 -.007 -.019 -.023 -.090 -.002  -.161 -.196 -.018 .149 -.019 .020 .136 .034 
10 RURAL .047 .055 .005 -.001 -.018 -.018 .111 .000 -.258  -.068 -.008 .135 -.247 -.105 -.462 .115 
11 OP_INC -.029 -.024 .001 -.001 .043 .037 .038 -.001 -.101 -.087  .109 -.225 .005 .107 .084 -.019 
12 CHAR_GR .076 .084 .176 .218 .213 .273 .024 .082 .047 -.027 .039  .110 .052 .036 .112 -.015 
13 GOV_REV .044 .054 -.008 .003 .049 .048 .064 .001 .137 .130 -.091 .052  -.015 .176 .032 .015 
14 BOD_SIZE -.079 -.081 -.001 .001 .020 .017 .036 .000 .001 -.231 -.005 -.008 .023  -.011 .196 .053 
15 GR_REV .367 .364 -.008 .007 -.029 -.013 -.028 .009 .075 -.102 .026 .039 .206 .002  .010 -.336 
16 BEDS -.128 -.128 -.004 .008 .012 .033 .075 -.002 .132 -.381 .095 .092 .089 .212 -.063  .106 
17 CASH -.138 -.136 -.005 -.003 -.012 -.010 .051 .002 .049 .042 -.047 -.029 -.005 .086 -.337 .015  
                   
Notes: Pearson (Spearman) coefficients are below (above) the diagonal.  Coefficients in italics, boldface, and boldface/italics are significant at the .10, .05, and 
.01 levels, respectively.  See Appendix 3 for variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.   
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TABLE 5 – ESTIMATION OF DISCRETIONARY CONTRACTUAL ALLOWANCES 
 
PANEL A: LEONE & VAN HORN (2005) MODEL 
 
DV = ΔCA 
Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates by Year 
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ΔGR_TOTAL 0.614 0.708 0.660 0.722 0.634 0.616 0.571 0.651 0.735 0.501 0.181 
ΔGR_MCARE 0.215 0.067 0.238 0.201 0.359 0.269 0.306 0.207 0.063 0.689 0.753 
ΔGR_MCAID 0.244 0.318 0.278 0.031 0.372 0.281 0.422 0.271 0.325 0.491 1.045 
CONSTANT 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.014 0.004 -0.006 
            
Observations 162 660 652 629 611 613 611 613 601 583 451 
Adjusted R
2
 .688 .718 .733 .731 .716 .745 .812 .725 .487 .583 .520 
 
PANEL B: MODIFIED LEONE & VAN HORN (2005) MODEL 
 
DV = ΔCA 
Unstandardized Coefficient Estimates by Year 
Variable 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ΔGR_TOTAL 0.430 0.267 0.655 0.678 0.537 0.292 0.376 0.215 0.405 0.405 0.164 
ΔGR_MCARE 0.402 0.503 0.242 0.243 0.455 0.585 0.498 0.663 0.375 0.776 0.773 
ΔGR_MCAID 0.407 0.826 0.283 0.074 0.447 0.583 0.586 0.619 0.661 0.565 1.058 
ΔGR_THIRD 0.205 0.543 0.008 0.057 0.134 0.441 0.293 0.620 0.443 0.162 0.030 
CONSTANT 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.013 0.004 -0.006 
            
Observations 162 660 652 629 611 613 611 613 601 583 451 
Adjusted R
2
 .689 .736 .732 .731 .716 .763 .817 .767 .497 .584 .519 
            
Notes: See Appendix 3 for variable definitions.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Coefficients in italics, boldface, and boldface/italics 
are significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.  The absolute values of the residuals from these regressions are used as the dependent variable in tests 
of H1 presented in Table 6. 
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Panel A presents the results of the LV annual regressions for 2002 through 2012.  This 
model yields a mean adjusted R-squared value of .678, with values ranging from .487 (2010) to 
.812 (2008).
20
  These values are interpreted as the non-discretionary component of contractual 
allowances, leaving 32.2%, on average, as the discretionary portion (i.e. earnings management).  
In 8 out of 11 years, all three predictor variables are at least marginally significant, which 
suggests that the change in a hospital’s contractual allowances can be explained in part by 
changes in total gross revenue, Medicare revenue, and Medicaid revenue.   
Panel B presents the results of the MLV model, which has a mean adjusted R-squared 
value of .686.  In all but two years, GR_TOTAL, GR_MCARE, and GR_MCAID are all 
significant at the .01 level.  As shown, the adjusted R-squared values are higher and the 
coefficient on GR_THIRD is statistically significant (p < .01) in roughly half of the yearly 
regressions.  This suggests that the change in third party gross revenue explains an incremental 
portion of the variation in contractual allowance changes. 
Table 6 presents the results of H1, which predicts that religious social norms influence 
religious hospital managers to engage in less earnings management than secular hospitals.  To 
test H1, the coefficient on REL_OWN is examined, with β1 expected to be negative.  Overall, the 
full (i.e. all quarters) LV model explains 29.0% of the variation in DCA_LV, while the adjusted 
R-squared for the fourth-quarter model is 24.5%.  In line with the prediction of H1, the 
coefficient on REL_OWN is negative and significant (-0.003, p < .05).  As expected, FQ4 is 
positive (0.003, p < .01), providing additional support for separately analyzing the fourth quarter.  
As shown in the second model, when the sample is restricted to the fourth quarter, the coefficient 
on REL_OWN is larger (-0.008) and more significant (p < .01) than when the sample includes all 
                                                 
20
 The mean adjusted R-squared of .678 reported in this paper is considerably larger than the .590 reported in the 
Leone and Van Horn (2005) study. 
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quarters.  Accordingly, it seems that religious hospitals manage earnings to a lesser extent than 
secular hospitals.  This result is especially strong during the fourth quarter, the period in which 
earnings management typically occurs. 
With respect to control variables, OP_INC (-0.014, p < .01), GOV_REV (-0.011, p < .05), 
BOD_SIZE (-0.020, p < .10), and BEDS (-0.001, p < .01) are all negative and at least marginally 
significant in the full LV model.  Therefore, it appears that earnings management is lower for 
hospitals with higher levels of operating income, greater concentrations of government revenue, 
larger boards, and more staffed beds.  On the other hand, RURAL (0.003, p < .10), GR_REV 
(0.013, p < .01) and DCA_LVt-1 (0.349, p < .01) are all significant and positive, which suggests 
that earnings management is higher for hospitals in rural areas and those with large amounts of 
gross revenue.  The positive sign of β11 indicates that earnings management is serially correlated 
as hypothesized.  These relationships are similar in the fourth quarter model for OP_INC (-0.033, 
p < .01), BOD_SIZE (-0.041, p < .05), GR_REV (0.013, p < .01), and DCA_LVt-1 (0.328, p < .01).  
Interestingly, REL_CTY and CHAR_GR are not significant in any of the models presented in 
Table 6. 
Results from the full and fourth-quarter MLV models are also presented in Table 6.  As 
described in the previous section, the only difference between the LV and MLV specifications is 
how the dependent variables are derived.  Results from these two models are similar to those 
discussed above in terms of explanatory power, coefficient estimates, and statistical significance.  
Specifically, the relationship between REL_OWN and DCA_MLV is negative in the full (-0.003, 
p < .10) and fourth-quarter models (-0.008, p < .01).  Combined, these results provide strong 
evidence in support of H1.  Supplemental analyses in the following section investigate whether 
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these results are the same for each major payor type (i.e. Medicare, Medicaid, and Third Party), 
confined to the fourth quarter, or affected by recent healthcare legislation. 
Tests of H2 are presented in Table 7.  Panel A provides results of the linear regression 
models, while Panel B shows logistic regression results.  Recall that the second hypothesis posits 
that religious hospitals engage in more classification management than secular hospitals.  To test 
H2, the coefficient on REL_OWN is examined, with β1 expected to be positive.  As shown in 
Panel A, the full (fourth-quarter) classification management models explain 20.6% (16.8%) and 
6.1% (11.8%) of the variation in CHAR_UN and CHAR_UN3Q, respectively.  Contrary to 
expectations, REL_OWN is not statistically significant in any of the four linear models.  
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TABLE 6 – TESTS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
  DV = DCA_LV   DV = DCA_MLV  
Variable Pred. ALL  FQ4  ALL  FQ4  
REL_OWN – -0.003  -0.008  -0.003  -0.008  
  (-2.093) ** (-2.846) *** (-1.931) * (-2.961) *** 
FQ4 + 0.003    0.004    
  (3.303) ***   (3.789) ***   
REL_CTY – 0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  
  (0.313)  (-0.500)  (0.339)  (-0.337)  
RURAL – 0.003  0.004  0.004  0.004  
  (1.822) * (1.353)  (1.977) ** (1.248)  
OP_INC + -0.014  -0.033  -0.011  -0.027  
  (-3.749) *** (-2.847) *** (-2.919) *** (-2.351) ** 
CHAR_GR + 0.065  0.072  0.075  0.088  
  (1.422)  (1.167)  (1.643)  (1.380)  
GOV_REV +/– -0.011  0.001  -0.009  0.001  
  (-2.059) ** (0.171)  (-1.811) * (0.218)  
BOD_SIZE + -0.020  -0.041  -0.021  -0.042  
  (-1.719) * (-2.127) ** (-1.890) * (-2.243) ** 
GR_REV +/– 0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  
  (11.194) *** (7.256) *** (12.027) *** (7.099) *** 
BEDS +/– -0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.000  
  (-3.034) *** (0.040)  (-3.114) *** (-0.093)  
EMt-1 + 0.349  0.328  0.350  0.342  
  (15.144) *** (6.362) *** (16.949) *** (7.436) *** 
CONSTANT +/– 0.018  0.016  0.018  0.015  
  (4.105) *** (1.940) * (4.203) *** (1.805) * 
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included  
          
Observations  5,529  1,380  5,529  1,380  
Adjusted R
2
  .290   .245   .287   .239  
          
Notes: This table presents the results of four linear regressions in which the dependent variable is either DCA_LV 
or DCA_MLV.  The first two models use DCA estimated using the standard Leone and Van Horn (2005) model 
(DCA_LV), while the latter two use DCA estimated using the Modified Leone and Van Horn (2005) model 
(DCA_MLV).  The estimation of both dependent variables is presented in Table 5.  See Appendix 3 for variable 
definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  T-stats are in parentheses 
below coefficient (unstandardized) estimates and are based on standard errors clustered by hospital.  ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).  Results are similar using 
the following alternate specifications: 1) Vansant (2013) DCA model, 2) inpatient/outpatient variations of LV and 
MLV models, 3) pooled cross-sectional variations of LV and MLV models, 4) continuous variables scaled by 
number of beds, 5) Huber-White robust standard errors, and 6) winsorizing at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. 
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Consistent with Fan et al. (2010) and the results of H1 above, it appears that nonprofit 
hospitals strategically manage the classification of charity care more in the fourth quarter than in 
interim quarters (CHAR_UN: 0.040, p < .01 and CHAR_UN3Q: 0.049, p < .01).  Regardless of 
the fiscal quarter, classification management is also higher for hospitals with large amounts of 
reported charity care as a percentage of total gross revenue (CHAR_UN: 2.790, p < .01 and 
CHAR_UN3Q: 2.843, p < .01).  Even stronger results are found during the fourth quarter 
(CHAR_UN: 4.708, p < .01 and CHAR_UN3Q: 4.699, p < .01).  Conversely, fourth-quarter 
classification management is lower for hospitals with large amounts of total gross revenue.  The 
coefficient on GR_REV  is negative and significant when either CHAR_UN (-0.041, p < .01) or 
CHAR_UN3Q (-0.034, p < .05) is used as the proxy for classification management. 
Panel B presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is either 
CHAR_UP or CHAR_UP3Q.  Recall that CHAR_UP (CHAR_UP3Q) is coded 1 if CHAR_UN 
(CHAR_UN3Q) is greater than 0.  Similar to the results in Panel A, FQ4 is positive and 
significant at the .01 level for both dependent variables (CHAR_UP: 0.191, p < .05 and 
CHAR_UP3Q: 0.328, p < .01).  Furthermore, the same relationships between CHAR_GR and 
both dichotomous dependent variables are found in Panel B.  In all four models, β6 is positive 
and highly significant (p < .01).  A similar fourth-quarter relationship is also seen for GR_REV (-
0.353, p < .01), but only when CHAR_UP is used. 
In the full CHAR_UP model, REL_OWN is positive (0.133) but not statistically different 
than zero.  However, it is positive and marginally significant when the sample is restricted to the 
fourth quarter (0.341, p < .10).   When CHAR_UP3Q is used, the coefficient on REL_OWN is 
positive but not significant for either model.  In summary, the evidence in Table 7 does not 
provide evidence in support of H2. 
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TABLE 7 – TESTS OF CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT 
 
PANEL A: LINEAR REGRESSIONS 
  DV = CHAR_UN   DV = CHAR_UN3Q  
Variable Pred. ALL  FQ4  ALL  FQ4  
REL_OWN + 0.010  0.002  0.008  -0.001  
  (0.994)  (0.092)  (0.768)  (-0.039)  
FQ4 + 0.040    0.049    
  (3.837) ***   (4.536) ***   
REL_CTY + -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
  (-1.880) * (-1.306)  (-1.499)  (-1.502)  
RURAL – -0.010  -0.028  -0.012  -0.027  
  (-1.201)  (-0.792)  (-1.291)  (-0.901)  
OP_INC + -0.042  0.082  -0.058  0.065  
  (-1.099)  (1.030)  (-1.359)  (0.844)  
CHAR_GR + 2.790  4.708  2.843  4.699  
  (5.934) *** (7.725) *** (5.632) *** (7.769) *** 
GOV_REV +/– -0.032  0.068  -0.051  0.057  
  (-0.639)  (0.830)  (-0.856)  (0.681)  
BOD_SIZE + 0.029  -0.058  0.005  -0.034  
  (0.466)  (-0.366)  (0.074)  (-0.220)  
GR_REV +/– -0.008  -0.041  -0.001  -0.034  
  (-1.316)  (-3.045) *** (-0.156)  (-2.422) ** 
BEDS +/– -0.005  -0.006  -0.003  -0.005  
  (-2.149) ** (-1.007)  (-1.202)  (-0.709)  
CASH + -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (-0.003)  (-0.074)  (0.640)  (0.248)  
CHAR_UNt-1 + -0.421  -0.318  0.061  0.094  
  (-22.440) *** (-4.690) *** (3.600) *** (1.825) * 
CONSTANT +/– 0.017  0.021  0.011  0.060  
  (0.444)  (0.322)  (0.254)  (0.933)  
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included  
          
Observations  4,660  1,169  4,653  1,168  
Adjusted R
2
  .206   .168   .061   .118  
 
 
(continued on next page)  
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TABLE 7 - CONTINUED 
 
PANEL B: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
  DV = CHAR_UP   DV = CHAR_UP3Q  
Variable Pred. ALL  FQ4  ALL  FQ4  
REL_OWN + 0.133  0.341  0.102  0.329  
  (1.129)  (1.658) * (1.102)  (1.593)  
FQ4 + 0.191    0.328    
  (2.231) **   (3.961) ***   
REL_CTY + -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
  (-0.999)  (-1.145)  (-1.626)  (-1.175)  
RURAL – -0.115  -0.014  -0.041  -0.034  
  (-0.972)  (-0.061)  (-0.419)  (-0.144)  
OP_INC + 0.042  0.967  -0.214  1.007  
  (0.132)  (1.716) * (-0.598)  (1.623)  
CHAR_GR + 20.661  30.870  28.423  38.504  
  (6.008) *** (6.685) *** (5.742) *** (6.228) *** 
GOV_REV +/– -0.160  0.224  -0.373  -0.096  
  (-0.403)  (0.415)  (-0.756)  (-0.146)  
BOD_SIZE + 0.790  -0.571  0.444  -0.894  
  (1.154)  (-0.394)  (0.532)  (-0.684)  
GR_REV +/– -0.089  -0.353  -0.002  -0.215  
  (-1.360)  (-2.625) *** (-0.027)  (-1.555)  
BEDS +/– -0.045  -0.008  0.000  -0.011  
  (-1.574)  (-0.145)  (0.001)  (-0.169)  
CASH + 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  
  (0.419)  (0.129)  (0.905)  (0.385)  
CHAR_UPt-1 + -1.206  -1.098  0.131  0.172  
  (-19.663) *** (-7.730) *** (2.240) ** (1.453)  
CONSTANT +/– 0.437  0.673  -0.223  0.093  
  (1.380)  (1.128)  (-0.582)  (0.151)  
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included  
          
Observations  4,660  1,169  4,653  1,168  
Pseudo R
2
  .076   .107   .037   .077  
          
Notes: This table presents the results of several linear (Panel A) and logistic (Panel B) regressions in which either 
CHAR_UN/CHAR_UN3Q or CHAR_UP/CHAR_UP3Q is used the dependent variable, respectively.  See 
Appendix 3 for variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  T-
stats are in parentheses below coefficient (unstandardized) estimates and are based on standard errors clustered by 
hospital.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Results are similar using the following alternate specifications: 1) DV = change in charity care as a percentage of 
total gross revenue, 2) Huber-White robust standard errors, and 3) winsorizing at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. 
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Supplemental analyses 
To extend the primary analyses above, several supplemental tests are conducted and 
discussed in detail below.  These tests investigate whether the earnings management results 
documented above are similar for all payors, confined to the fourth quarter, or influenced by 
recent healthcare legislation that had the potential to change managerial incentives to manipulate 
financial performance. 
Payor-specific 
First, H1 is separately tested by major payor type (i.e. Medicare, Medicaid, and Third 
Party) to identify for which payor(s), if any, secular and religious hospitals differentially manage 
contractual allowances.  They may engage in differential earnings management behavior because 
the revenue from these payors represents services provided to patients of different demographic 
backgrounds.  While Medicare insures elderly patients, Medicaid is only available to low-income 
individuals.  On the other hand, Third Party revenue corresponds to patients with private 
insurance policies, with plans available to individuals regardless of age or income level.  To run 
the analyses, DCA is estimated by regressing the change in contractual allowances on the change 
in total gross revenue for each payor type.  Similar to above, the absolute values of the residuals 
from the annual DCA regressions are used as the dependent variables in supplemental tests of 
H1.  Results from the payor-specific analyses are presented in Table 8. 
As shown in Panel A, which uses observations from all quarters, the coefficient on 
REL_OWN is negative (-0.002) and marginally significant for Medicaid (p < .10) but not for 
Medicare or Third Party.  Therefore, when considering all fiscal quarters, there does not appear 
to be a meaningful difference in the extent to which secular and religious hospitals manage 
contractual allowances for those two payors.  However, when the sample is restricted to the 
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fourth quarter, Panel B shows that REL_OWN is at least marginally significant for all three payor 
types.  Specifically, the coefficient is negative and marginally significant for Medicare and Third 
Party (-0.002, p < .10).  Interestingly, the most significant difference in the fourth quarter 
pertains to Medicaid (-0.005, p < .05).  Based on the results in Table 8, it appears that religious 
hospitals are much less likely than secular hospitals to manage Medicaid contractual allowances, 
especially during the fourth quarter.  This finding is especially interesting given that the 
Medicaid program was designed to aid low-income individuals, a demographic that receives a 
considerable amount of focus from religiously affiliated hospitals.  There is some limited 
evidence to suggest that religious hospitals may also manage fourth-quarter Medicare and Third 
Party contractual allowances to a lesser extent than secular hospitals. 
Quarter-specific 
Second, to further investigate the timing of potential financial reporting manipulation, all 
earnings management and classification management models are estimated separately by quarter.  
For brevity, only results from the earnings management analysis using DCA_MLV as the 
dependent variable are presented in Table 9.  Results are similar if DCA_LV is used as the 
dependent variable in tests of earnings management.  With respect to the classification 
management analyses, the coefficient on REL_OWN is not significant in any interim quarter 
using a linear or logistic regression model. 
Table 9 documents that the earnings management difference between secular and 
religious hospitals appears to be limited to the fourth quarter.  For all interim fiscal quarters, the 
coefficient on REL_OWN is not statistically different from zero.  However, as documented in the 
previous section, the coefficient is negative (-0.008) and significant at the .01 level when the 
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sample is restricted to the fourth quarter.  This finding is significant given that prior research has 
documented that manipulation is most likely to occur in the fourth quarter. 
TABLE 8 – EARNINGS MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS BY PAYOR TYPE 
 
PANEL A: FQ = ALL 
  PAYOR TYPE  
Variable Pred. MCARE  MCAID  THIRD  
REL_OWN – -0.001  -0.002  0.000  
  (-1.154)  (-1.862) * (0.293)  
FQ4 + 0.000  0.002  0.001  
  (0.273)  (1.935) * (1.215)  
REL_CTY – 0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (1.562)  (2.043) ** (0.679)  
RURAL – 0.003  0.003  0.001  
  (2.213) ** (2.240) ** (0.757)  
OP_INC + 0.001  -0.006  0.002  
  (0.296)  (-1.939) * (0.598)  
CHAR_GR + -0.011  0.054  -0.000  
  (-0.689)  (1.840) * (-0.011)  
GOV_REV +/– 0.008  0.010  -0.011  
  (3.931) *** (4.617) *** (-3.160) *** 
BOD_SIZE + -0.004  -0.027  -0.005  
  (-0.635)  (-2.660) *** (-0.736)  
GR_REV +/– 0.006  0.006  0.010  
  (9.761) *** (5.752) *** (11.969) *** 
BEDS +/– -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  
  (-5.350) *** (-1.163)  (-3.653) *** 
EMt-1 + 0.381  0.430  0.355  
  (14.775) *** (18.187) *** (13.489) *** 
CONSTANT +/– 0.003  -0.004  0.014  
  (1.211)  (-1.252)  (3.991) *** 
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  
        
Observations  5,529  5,529  5,529  
Adjusted R
2
  .320   .337   .323   
 
 
(continued on next page) 
  
 51 
  
TABLE 8 – CONTINUED 
PANEL B: FQ = 4 
  PAYOR TYPE  
Variable Pred. MCARE  MCAID  THIRD  
REL_OWN – -0.002  -0.005  -0.002  
  (-1.760) * (-2.525) ** (-1.880) * 
REL_CTY – 0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (2.118) ** (1.015)  (0.286)  
RURAL – 0.004  0.005  0.002  
  (1.744) * (1.750) * (1.203)  
OP_INC + -0.003  -0.015  -0.002  
  (-0.698)  (-2.410) ** (-0.345)  
CHAR_GR + -0.003  0.080  0.008  
  (-0.109)  (1.525)  (0.207)  
GOV_REV +/– 0.009  0.017  -0.011  
  (3.045) *** (4.569) *** (-2.821) *** 
BOD_SIZE + 0.003  -0.053  0.001  
  (0.322)  (-3.084) *** (0.045)  
GR_REV +/– 0.007  0.007  0.010  
  (6.385) *** (5.313) *** (5.949) *** 
BEDS +/– -0.001  0.000  -0.000  
  (-2.763) *** (0.624)  (-0.904)  
EMt-1 + 0.357  0.363  0.399  
  (7.486) *** (6.381) *** (10.188) *** 
CONSTANT +/– -0.011  0.001  0.004  
  (-3.010) *** (0.262)  (0.761)  
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  
        
Observations  1,380  1,380  1,380  
Adjusted R
2
  .330   .280   .345   
        
Notes: This table presents supplemental earnings management analyses by payor type (MCARE = Medicare, 
MCAID = Medicaid, and THIRD = Third Party).  Panel A presents regression results using all fiscal quarters, 
while Panel B shows results when the sample is restricted to the fourth quarter.  The DV for each model is a 
payor-specific variation of DCA as discussed in section III.  For example, the DV in the first model is the 
absolute value of the residuals from yearly regressions in which the change in Medicare contractual allowances is 
regressed on the change in Medicare gross revenue.  See Appendix 3 for variable definitions.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  T-stats are in parentheses below coefficient 
(unstandardized) estimates and are based on standard errors clustered by hospital.  ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 9 – EARNINGS MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS BY QUARTER 
  DV = DCA_MLV  
Variable Pred. FQ = 1  FQ = 2  FQ = 3  FQ = 4  
REL_OWN – -0.002  -0.001  0.000  -0.008  
  (-0.739)  (-0.185)  (0.088)  (-2.961) *** 
REL_CTY – 0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
  (0.400)  (1.485)  (-0.987)  (-0.337)  
RURAL – -0.002  0.010  0.001  0.004  
  (-1.010)  (3.340) *** (0.253)  (1.248)  
OP_INC + -0.001  -0.010  -0.007  -0.027  
  (-0.079)  (-1.309)  (-1.210)  (-2.351) ** 
CHAR_GR + 0.111  0.098  0.009  0.088  
  (1.254)  (1.279)  (0.173)  (1.380)  
GOV_REV +/– -0.017  -0.014  -0.009  0.001  
  (-1.733) * (-2.091) ** (-1.205)  (0.218)  
BOD_SIZE + -0.013  -0.008  -0.022  -0.042  
  (-0.591)  (-0.521)  (-1.885) * (-2.243) ** 
GR_REV +/– 0.014  0.014  0.009  0.013  
  (5.461) *** (5.741) *** (5.815) *** (7.099) *** 
BEDS +/– -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.000  
  (-1.275)  (-3.660) *** (-2.867) *** (-0.093)  
EMt-1 + 0.394  0.204  0.508  0.342  
  (9.544) *** (4.761) *** (8.760) *** (7.436) *** 
CONSTANT +/– 0.026  0.006  0.022  0.015  
  (3.205) *** (1.028)  (4.107) *** (1.805) * 
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included  
          
Observations  1,383  1,382  1,384  1,380  
Adjusted R
2
  .360   .245   .390   .239  
          
Notes: This table presents supplemental earnings management analyses by individual quarter.  See Appendix 3 
for variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  T-stats are in 
parentheses below coefficient (unstandardized) estimates and are based on standard errors clustered by hospital.  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
As a final supplemental test, this study considers the potential impact of the ACA on 
hospital incentives to manage earnings.  As a result of the legislation, nonprofit hospitals are now 
subject to additional reporting requirements regarding their financial performance (e.g. reported 
income).  For the purposes of this study, the ACA is significant because it increases the visibility 
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of hospital performance and the requirements for hospitals to maintain tax-exempt status (U.S. 
Congress 2010).  Perhaps the most noteworthy element of the legislation is the requirement to 
submit audited financial statements with Form 990 for tax years beginning after March 23, 2010.  
Given the heightened visibility of performance following this regulatory change, it is possible 
that managers may feel more pressure to artificially inflate or deflate financial results.  However, 
the increased reporting requirements may deter financial reporting manipulation through 
increased transparency.  Consequently, this research does not make a directional prediction 
regarding the effect of the ACA on earnings management. 
To test the effect of this regulation, two additional variables are added to the earnings 
management models.  The first variable, ACA, is an indicator variable coded 1 if the observation 
is in the post-ACA period (i.e. after the first quarter of 2010) and 0 otherwise.  The second 
variable, ACA_REL, represents the interaction between ACA and REL_OWN and is included to 
determine whether the legislation has differentially affected secular and religious hospitals.  
Given that the focus of this study is on differences in financial reporting behavior based on 
ownership type (i.e. secular vs. religious), ACA_REL is the primary variable of interest in the 
ACA models presented in Table 10.  Two models are estimated for each proxy of earnings 
management, DCA_LV and DCA_MLV, resulting in a total of four regressions.  In all models, 
observations from all fiscal quarters are included.  The first and third models in Table 10 use 
observations from all years, while the second and fourth models only use observations from 2008 
to 2012.  The reason for this limited sample is to investigate the impact of the ACA policy using 
data immediately before and after the effective date in 2010. 
As shown in Table 10, the coefficient on REL_OWN remains statistically significant in all 
four models after the inclusion of ACA and ACA_REL.  Specifically, the coefficient is negative 
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and significant at the .05 level when observations from all years are used, regardless of whether 
DCA_LV (-0.003) or DCA_MLV (-0.002) is used as the dependent variable.  Religious ownership 
also appears to have a significant effect when the sample is restricted to 2008 through 2012.  
Specifically, REL_OWN is negative and at least marginally significant if DCA_LV (-0.004, p < 
.01) or DCA_MLV is used (-0.003, p < .10). 
Table 10 also shows that the coefficient on ACA is positive and significant at the .01 level 
in all models, suggesting that earnings management has increased significantly following the 
ACA legislation.  This finding is interesting because it documents an undesirable consequence 
from the increase in reporting requirements mandated by the ACA.  However, the interaction 
term (ACA_REL) is not significant in any of the four models.  Consequently, it does not appear 
that the passage of the ACA has differentially affected the earnings management behavior of 
secular and religious hospitals.   
Robustness checks 
To ensure that results are not the artifact of a particular model specification, numerous 
robustness checks are conducted (results not tabulated).  The first set of robustness tests relate to 
the variable of interest, REL_OWN.  As discussed above, the hospital’s ownership type is 
determined using the 2013 quarterly OSHPD reports.  To evaluate the accuracy of these data, the 
ownership type as reported on the 2013 quarterly reports is compared to the ownership type 
indicated on the annual reports.  Differences are found in 28 of the 171 hospitals in the H1 
sample (16.4%), which corresponds to a total of 779 observations (14.1%).  These differences 
are reconciled via hand-collection of individual hospital quarterly and annual reports and hospital 
websites.   
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TABLE 10 – AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ANALYSIS 
  DV = DCA_LV  DV = DCA_MLV  
Variable Pred. ALL YR  08-12  ALL YR  08-12  
REL_OWN – -0.003  -0.004  -0.002  -0.003  
  (-2.403) ** (-2.655) *** (-2.083) ** (-1.881) * 
ACA +/– 0.007  0.008  0.007  0.008  
  (3.007) *** (3.150) *** (2.950) *** (3.161) *** 
ACA_REL +/– 0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  
  (0.062)  (0.144)  (-0.208)  (-0.432)  
FQ4 + 0.003  0.001  0.004  0.001  
  (3.062) *** (0.382)  (3.558) *** (0.656)  
REL_CTY – 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (0.317)  (0.565)  (0.346)  (0.440)  
RURAL – 0.003  0.006  0.004  0.006  
  (1.825) * (2.137) ** (1.980) ** (2.152) ** 
OP_INC + -0.014  -0.024  -0.011  -0.016  
  (-3.722) *** (-3.225) *** (-2.901) *** (-2.459) ** 
CHAR_GR + 0.063  0.038  0.074  0.053  
  (1.390)  (0.716)  (1.614)  (1.033)  
GOV_REV +/– -0.011  -0.000  -0.009  0.001  
  (-2.054) ** (-0.087)  (-1.803) * (0.285)  
BOD_SIZE + -0.020  -0.025  -0.021  -0.027  
  (-1.720) * (-2.369) ** (-1.895) * (-2.582) ** 
GR_REV +/– 0.013  0.011  0.013  0.010  
  (11.205) *** (7.195) *** (12.037) *** (7.296) *** 
BEDS +/– -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
  (-3.022) *** (-1.354)  (-3.102) *** (-1.652)  
EMt-1 + 0.348  0.365  0.349  0.361  
  (15.096) *** (10.019) *** (16.869) *** (11.618) *** 
CONSTANT +/– 0.018  0.003  0.018  0.003  
  (4.092) *** (0.546)  (4.182) *** (0.593)  
YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included  
          
Observations  5,529  2,253  5,529  2,253  
Adjusted R
2
  .291   .301   .288   .288  
          
Notes: This table presents results from supplemental earnings management analyses regarding the Affordable 
Care Act legislation.  In all models, observations from all quarters are included.  The first and third models (ALL 
YEAR) include observations from all years, while the second and fourth models (08-12) include only 
observations from 2008 through 2012.  See Appendix 3 for variable definitions.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  T-stats are in parentheses below coefficient (unstandardized) estimates 
and are based on standard errors clustered by hospital.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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An investigation of these differences reveals that for five hospitals, the quarterly reports 
correctly list the facilities as religious hospitals, while the annual reports incorrectly indicate they 
are secular.  Since the quarterly classification is accurate, no correction is made for these 180 
observations.  However, a comparison of quarterly and annual data reveals that 16 religious 
hospitals are incorrectly coded as secular.  Therefore, the secular/religious classification of these 
476 observations is corrected and all models are re-estimated.  Finally, a total of 123 
observations are removed from the analyses because they correspond to seven different for-profit 
hospitals.  When these adjustments are made, results are slightly stronger than those previously 
reported. 
Several robustness checks related to the choice of proxies for earnings management and 
classification management are also performed.  For all alternate specifications listed below, 
results are the same as previously reported.  First, the Vansant (2013) approach, which models 
contractual allowances as a function of the changes in total gross revenue and total governmental 
payor revenue (i.e. Medicare and Medicaid), is used to estimate DCA.  The first hypothesis is 
then tested using the absolute values of the residuals from the Vansant (2013) annual regressions 
to examine the sensitivity of reported results to an additional specification.  Second, because the 
nature of services provided (e.g. inpatient vs. outpatient) potentially affects reimbursement from 
payors (and the estimation of contractual allowances), the LV and MLV models are modified by 
separating each payor component of gross revenue into its inpatient and outpatient portions.  
Third, the LV and MLV models are estimated in a pooled cross-sectional regression rather than 
by year as an alternate means of calculating the proxies for earnings management.  Fourth, to 
reduce the number of observations lost when scaling by total assets, the number of staffed beds is 
used in the estimation of DCA.  Fifth, in tests of classification management, the change in 
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charity care as a percentage of total gross revenue is employed as an alternate dependent 
variable.   
Finally, two additional general robustness checks are performed for the earnings 
management and classification management analyses.  The first test removes hospital clustering 
of standard errors, while the second sets extreme continuous variables at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles.  Regardless of the choice of standard error correction or method of winsorization, all 
conclusions remain similar to those previously reported.   
Summary of results 
Using multiple empirical proxies for financial reporting manipulation, results from this 
research suggest that religious hospitals manage earnings less than secular hospitals.  Although 
univariate evidence implies that religious hospitals may artificially increase their charity care 
ratio more frequently than secular hospitals, regression results are not conclusive.  Supplemental 
tests indicate that the earnings management result is being driven by differences in the fourth 
quarter, the period in which manipulation is most likely to occur.  Subsequent tests also reveal 
that the biggest difference between secular and religious hospitals with respect to earnings 
management occurs for the Medicaid payor.  However, there is limited evidence that religious 
hospitals strategically manage contractual allowances for Medicare and Third Party payors to a 
lesser extent than secular hospitals during the fourth quarter.   
 During the sample period, financial reporting incentives experienced a potential shock as 
a result of new healthcare legislation, primarily due to increase reporting requirements to 
maintain tax-exempt status.  Additional analyses document that although earnings management 
is higher in quarters following the passage of the ACA, the effect on financial reporting is not 
significantly different for secular and religious hospitals.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 As discussed above, this research provides important evidence of the role of a critical, but 
often overlooked social factor, religious ownership, in shaping financial reporting behavior.  This 
section provides a summary of the dissertation, including the motivation for examining religion, 
research methodology used, results of empirical tests, research contributions, and implications 
for hospital stakeholders.  Furthermore, it provides a discussion of limitations, as well as areas 
for future research.   
Summary 
Investors, creditors, auditors, standard setters, regulators and other stakeholders have 
been concerned with financial reporting manipulation for many years.  Consequently, researchers 
in the accounting and finance disciplines have spent a considerable amount of effort trying to 
understand and explain why reporting irregularities occur and how they can be prevented.  One 
recent stream of research in accounting (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012) has shown 
that religious social norms can serve a governance role and potentially deter certain types of 
unethical financial reporting behavior.  However, this line of research is small and almost 
exclusively focuses on the reporting decisions of large, publicly traded entities.  Furthermore, 
these studies use an indirect, location-based measure of religiosity that is a function of the 
surrounding population’s level of religious affiliation.  In the nonprofit sector, organizations have 
the potential to be affected by religion in ways other than simply dispersion of religious beliefs 
within a given geographic area.    
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This paper extends the literature by using a more direct measure of religiosity, the 
ownership affiliation of a hospital, in a nonprofit setting.  Specifically, this research investigates 
the role of hospital ownership (i.e. secular vs. religious) in financial reporting using multiple 
variations of two general types of potential manipulation: earnings management and 
classification management.  Given that nonprofit organizations technically do not have a profit 
motive, it is important to look at other means of manipulation beyond those that affect reported 
earnings.  Furthermore, this study examines the timing and source of manipulation, as well as the 
effect on managerial incentives of recent healthcare legislation.  Results from this research 
enhance our understanding of the importance of religion in a corporate context and have 
implications for a variety of hospital stakeholders, including audit firms, tax authorities, various 
regulatory agencies, potential donors, and debt holders. 
As previously discussed, nonprofit hospital managers have opposing incentives to 
artificially inflate or deflate the amount of earnings they report in a given period.  While the 
markets for debt financing and executive labor create an upward pressure on income, especially 
when facing a potential net loss, increased scrutiny from taxing authorities, potential donors, and 
other third parties in the presence of high profits can drive desired income downward (Trueman 
and Titman 1988; Leone and Van Horn 2005).  Consistent with these arguments, the historical 
distribution of earnings suggests that nonprofit hospitals may strategically manage financial 
results to a target income just above zero (e.g. Leone and Van Horn 2005; Ballantine et al. 2007).  
This finding suggests that nonprofit hospitals behave much like for-profit firms in that they 
prefer to avoid reporting a loss, even though they do not have a true profit motive (e.g. Hayn 
1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999).  Other recent research finds that 
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earnings management activities in nonprofit hospitals are especially prevalent when charity care 
levels are higher than expectations (Vansant 2013). 
In addition to manipulating reporting income, research in accounting has also shown that 
nonprofit hospitals engage in various types of classification management to report favorable 
performance on key metrics.  For example, Krishnan and Yetman (2011) find evidence that 
managers shift costs to improve their efficiency ratios.  Given that providing charity care to the 
community is an integral part of a hospital’s mission and an important determinant for renewal 
of tax exemptions, managers have strong incentives to strategically shift costs from bad debt to 
charity care.  These motives are particularly salient following the recent outcry in the popular 
press (e.g. New York Times, The Charlotte Observer, and The News & Observer) against 
hospitals that provide inadequate levels of charity care.  As a result, hospitals that manage 
charity care classification appear more favorable on one critical dimension of performance while 
the level of reported income remains constant.  In response to these incentives, Eldenburg and 
Vines (2004) show that certain hospitals, specifically those with large amounts of cash, 
strategically shift bad debt costs to charity care. 
Recently, accounting and finance researchers have begun investigating the influence of 
religion on various aspects of corporate behavior.  For example, Hilary and Hui (2009) document 
more conservative investment decisions and lower growth in companies located in highly 
religious geographic areas.  They attribute their finding to greater risk aversion in companies in 
more religious areas.  Similarly, Shu et al. (2012) show that the type of religion (i.e. Catholic vs. 
Protestant) is also important with regard to investment by mutual fund managers.  They find that 
mutual funds located in largely Catholic areas experience more volatile returns than their 
Protestant counterparts, due in part to differences in risk preferences.  Religion also appears to 
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have a significant impact on corporate tax decisions and valuation.  Specifically, Dyreng et al. 
(2012) and Boone et al. (2013) find lower rates of tax avoidance for firms in religious areas.  
Interestingly, choosing to locate a business in an area with strong religious norms may result in a 
lower cost of equity capital (El Ghoul et al. 2012). 
Other research has shown that religion also has a profound impact on reporting decisions 
of corporations and audit firms.  For example, Omer et al. (2013) find that auditors, particularly 
non-Big 4 firms, that are located in highly religious areas tend to issue more going concern 
opinions due to risk aversion.  With respect to corporate financial reporting, Dyreng et al. (2012) 
and McGuire et al. (2012) both show that accruals-based earnings management is lower for 
companies in more religious areas.  They attribute this finding to religious social norms 
influencing reporting behavior to conform to what others deem as acceptable (Kohlberg 1984).  
In a related study, Swenson (2012) concludes that the type of religion also plays an important 
role in financial reporting behavior.  Specifically, she shows that firms are more conservative in 
areas of Western religion dominance (e.g. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) compared to those in 
areas of Eastern religion dominance (e.g. Buddhism and Hinduism).  Together, these studies 
provide evidence that religion appears to be an important factor in many corporate decisions. 
Although religion plays a major role in the nonprofit sector, especially in the healthcare 
industry, research has largely ignored the extent to which nonprofit financial reporting is affected 
by religious social norms.  To address this issue, this study investigates the effect of religious 
ownership on two types of financial reporting manipulation: earnings management and 
classification management.  The first hypothesis tests for differences across hospital ownership 
type in earnings management behavior.  Specifically, social norm theory and the results of recent 
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accounting studies (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012) predict that religious hospitals 
manage earnings less than secular hospitals.   
The second hypothesis addresses differences in classification management activities.  In 
this study, classification management is defined by changes in charity care ratios.  Even though 
all nonprofit hospitals have an incentive to show high levels of charity care, religious hospitals 
may feel more pressure to do so because of their spiritual missions.  Religious hospitals may use 
this type of financial reporting manipulation through classification, particularly if religious social 
norms are constraining other methods of manipulation such as earnings management.  
Accordingly, this study expects that religious hospitals will exhibit higher levels of classification 
management than secular hospitals.   
In order to test these two hypotheses, multiple proxies for earnings management and 
classification management are calculated.  Following prior research (e.g. Eldenburg and Vines 
2004; Leone and Van Horn 2005), these proxies are healthcare specific.  With respect to the first 
hypothesis, a measure of earnings management based on contractual allowances is estimated 
using two variations of the model presented by Leone and Van Horn (2005).  Because of the 
complexity, timing of payments, volume of transactions, and variability inherent in payor 
contracts, developing an accurate estimate is difficult, leaving hospital managers with a 
considerable amount of discretion over reported contractual allowances.  With respect to the 
second hypothesis, changes in charity care as a percentage of uncompensated care is used as the 
proxy for classification management.  Numerous regressions are estimated to test for differences 
between secular and religious hospitals for each measure of earnings management and 
classification management. 
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The sample in this study uses publicly available data for all California nonprofit hospitals 
from fiscal years 2002 through 2012 collected by the OSHPD.  Only comparable facilities as 
defined by OSHPD are included in the analyses.  A total of 5,529 and 4,942 observations are 
used in tests of earnings management and classification management, respectively.  Because they 
provide a purer measure of management’s reporting intent and provide insight into the timing of 
potential manipulation, quarterly data is used in all analyses.  Prior research (e.g. Jeter and 
Shivakumar 1999; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Das et al. 2009; Fan et al. 2010) also motivates the use 
of quarterly data, as well as separate analyses of fourth-quarter differences in all dependent 
measures. 
 As hypothesized, results from this research suggest that religiosity plays a governance 
role in deterring earnings management activities.  Specifically, this study finds that religious 
hospitals manage earnings significantly less than secular hospitals, likely due to the impact of 
strong religious social norms.  However, contrary to expectations, secular and religious hospitals 
do not appear to differ with respect to strategic charity care classification behavior.  One 
potential reason for this lack of difference may be that all nonprofit hospitals, regardless of 
ownership type, place a heavy emphasis on reporting favorable charity care amounts to avoid 
regulatory scrutiny.   
Supplemental tests indicate that the relationship between religious ownership and 
earnings management discussed above is confined to the fourth quarter, the period in which 
financial reporting manipulation is most likely to occur.  Furthermore, additional tests reveal that 
the constraining effect of religiosity on earnings management is strongest for the Medicaid 
payor.  That is, religious hospitals artificially manage Medicaid contractual allowances to a 
lesser extent than secular hospitals, and this difference is greater for Medicaid than for other 
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major payor types (i.e. Medicare and Third Party).  Since the Medicaid program is designed to 
assist low-income individuals, an important demographic for most religious organizations, this 
result could be due to religious hospitals being even less willing to artificially manipulate 
revenue from this particular payor.  In addition to Medicaid, however, there is also limited 
evidence that religious hospitals strategically manage fourth-quarter contractual allowances for 
Medicare and Third Party payors to a lesser extent than secular hospitals.   
Subsequent tests also investigate a potential change to managerial incentives following 
the passage of new healthcare legislation (i.e. the ACA).  In addition to watershed changes to 
insurance coverage for millions of Americans, the ACA increased reporting requirements for all 
nonprofit hospitals.  As expected, earnings management appears to be greater after the passage of 
the ACA in 2010.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that the financial reporting effect of 
the ACA is different for secular and religious hospitals. 
Understanding the financial reporting behavior of secular and religious nonprofit 
hospitals, and in particular the role of religion, is important because of their widespread impact 
on the U.S. economy.  The AHA estimates that there are approximately 2,900 nonprofit hospitals 
in the United States, of which roughly 16.0% are owned and operated by a religious organization 
(AHA 2014).  According to the CBO, U.S. healthcare spending as a percent of gross domestic 
product has been steadily rising in the past 30 years.  Current projections indicate that this 
percentage is expected to top 22.0% by 2038 (CBO 2013).  Despite this significance, there has 
been relatively limited research on the financial reporting behavior of nonprofit hospitals.   
This study is important because it provides empirical evidence of the role that religion 
plays in the financial reporting process.  First, it complements a recent stream of for-profit 
accounting research that focuses on the religious characteristics of the location in which a 
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company operates.  Specifically, this research extends the literature and improves our 
understanding of religion’s role in corporate behavior by using a more direct measure of 
religiosity, a hospital’s ownership type.  Evaluating the influence of hospital ownership is 
important because religious affiliations are pervasive in the nonprofit sector, including the 
healthcare industry.     
Another important contribution of this study is that it provides a more comprehensive 
model of earnings management to be used in future healthcare accounting research.  
Furthermore, the use of quarterly data allows for a purer measure of management’s reporting 
intentions than currently found in the literature.  In summary, this study provides a more 
complete picture of the role of religious affiliation with respect to the nature, timing, and extent 
of financial reporting decisions of nonprofit hospitals.   
Results from this dissertation have important implications for a variety of hospital 
stakeholders.  The earnings management analysis provides users (e.g. audit firms, tax authorities, 
various regulatory agencies, potential donors, debt holders, and other hospital stakeholders) an 
important, easily identifiable social factor to consider when evaluating the reliability of hospital 
financial statements.  As documented above, knowing a hospital’s ownership affiliation (e.g. 
secular vs. religious) is especially useful when analyzing fourth-quarter reports.  Similarly, the 
classification management analysis informs tax authorities and other regulators of how the nature 
of hospital ownership potentially influences the timing and extent of unethical reporting 
activities related to charity care.  Given the significant focus on charity care in the nonprofit 
healthcare sector, these results are timely and of particular interest to a variety of individuals and 
organizations.  This study also has implications for accounting researchers by providing an 
improved hospital-specific model of earnings management, as well as additional evidence in 
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support of using quarterly data in studies of financial reporting manipulation.  Finally, results 
from this research should generalize to other large industries within the nonprofit sector (e.g. 
higher education). 
Limitations 
Due to the nature of this study, a number of limitations exist.  First, each state in the U.S. 
has the authority to require statutory reporting requirements for hospitals that operate within the 
state.  As a result, the amount of financial information provided by any given state varies widely, 
ranging from limited aggregate data (e.g. Mississippi) to extensive individual hospital data (e.g. 
California).  Consistent with recent prior research on nonprofit hospitals (e.g. Eldenburg et al. 
2011; Krishnan and Yetman 2011; Vansant 2013), data from only California is used.  However, 
this data is considered to be representative of the U.S. population of hospitals due to California’s 
large size and diversity.  While there is no reason to expect that the results found would not hold 
in other states, it is possible that meaningful differences may exist.   
Additionally, all data used in this study is self-reported, including the variable of interest, 
hospital ownership.  In supplemental tests, differences in the quarterly and annual reported 
values of REL_OWN are reconciled and corrected as necessary, with little effect on results.  
Further, because earnings management and classification management are not observable, 
various proxies must be developed.  If these proxies are measured with error, any conclusions 
derived may be incorrect.  Following prior research (e.g. Leone and Van Horn 2005; Vansant 
2013), multiple hospital-specific accounts for the estimation of DCA are used to minimize the 
potential for measurement error.  Furthermore, Eldenburg and Vines (2004) serves as the 
primary source for tests of classification management.  For all models, various specifications are 
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estimated to test the validity of all inferences.  Results from these tests indicate that findings are 
robust to a battery of alternate design choices and model specifications. 
Future research 
Understanding the role of religion in shaping financial reporting behavior is important 
and deserves greater attention from accounting researchers, particularly within the nonprofit 
sector where religious affiliations are especially common.  Future research could address 
whether the results presented in this study are similar using other measures of financial reporting 
manipulation.  For example, McGuire et al. (2012) show that real earnings management is higher 
for companies in more religious areas.  However, it is unclear whether this is true for hospitals 
with a religious ownership.  While there is no reason to believe that meaningful differences 
would exist across industries, research could also investigate the financial reporting implications 
of religious affiliation in higher education and other large nonprofit industries.  Finally, future 
research could further investigate the impact of the ACA, regardless of hospital ownership type. 
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Key Healthcare Definitions 
 
 Term Definition 
Acute care general 
hospital 
A licensed hospital having a duly constituted governing body with 
overall administrative and professional responsibility and an 
organized medical staff which provides 24- hour inpatient care, 
including the following basic services: medical, nursing, surgical, 
anesthesia, laboratory, radiology, pharmacy, and dietary services 
(CDPH).  
Bad debt Services for which hospitals anticipated but did not receive 
payment (AHA). 
Charity care The difference between gross patient revenue (based on full 
established charges) for services rendered to patients who are 
unable to pay for all or part of the services provided, and the 
amount paid by or on behalf of the patient (OSHPD). 
Contractual allowance The difference between billings at full established rates and 
amounts received or receivable from third-party payors under 
formal contract agreements (OSHPD). 
Gross inpatient revenue Total inpatient (i.e. patient is formally admitted) charges at the 
hospital's full established rates for daily hospital services, inpatient 
ambulatory services, and inpatient ancillary services before 
deductions from revenue are applied (OSHPD).  
Gross outpatient revenue Total outpatient (i.e. patient not formally admitted) charges at the 
hospital's full established rates for outpatient ambulatory and 
outpatient ancillary services rendered and goods sold (OSHPD). 
Long-term care hospital Long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) furnish extended medical and 
rehabilitative care to individuals with clinically complex problems, 
such as multiple acute or chronic conditions, that need hospital-
level care for relatively extended periods (AHA). 
Payor - Medicaid A joint federal and state program that helps with medical costs for 
some people with limited income and resources 
(www.medicare.gov). 
Payor - Medicare Medicare is the federal health insurance program for people who 
are 65 or older, certain younger people with disabilities, and people 
with End-Stage Renal Disease (www.medicare.gov). 
Payor - Other Third 
Parties 
Includes all other forms of health coverage such as private 
insurance providers (e.g. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Aetna, etc.) 
(OSHPD). 
Shriners hospital A specialty hospital for children with serious injuries, diseases, or 
birth defects that provides services without regard to a patient's 
ability to pay.  These hospitals are granted reduced reporting 
requirements by OSHPD. 
Staffed beds The average daily complement of beds (excluding nursery 
bassinets) that are set-up, staffed, and equipped, and in all respects, 
ready for use by patients remaining in the hospital overnight 
(OSHPD). 
 76 
  
 Term Definition 
Uncompensated care An overall measure of hospital care provided for which no payment 
was received from the patient or insurer. It is the sum of a hospital's 
bad debt and the charity care it provides. Uncompensated care 
excludes other unfunded costs of care, such as underpayment from 
Medicaid and Medicare, which is captured in the contractual 
allowance account for each payor (AHA). 
  
Notes: Visit www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/Manuals/Apndxb.pdf for a more 
comprehensive list of healthcare definitions. 
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Panel A: List of Hospitals 
 
 
Facility Name County Facility No. 
Alta Bates Medical Center Alameda 106010739 
Alta Bates Summit Medical Center Alameda 106010937 
American Recovery Center Los Angeles 106194010 
Arroyo Grande Community Hospital San Luis Obispo 106400466 
Avalon Municipal Hospital & Clinic Los Angeles 106190045 
Bakersfield Memorial Hospital Kern 106150722 
Banner Lassen Medical Center Lassen 106184008 
Barton Memorial Hospital El Dorado 106090793 
Betty Ford Center Riverside 106330120 
Beverly Hospital Los Angeles 106190081 
Biggs Gridley Memorial Hospital Butte 106040802 
California Hospital Medical Center Los Angeles 106190125 
California Pacific Medical Center San Francisco 106380929 
California Specialty Hospital Solano 106481015 
Casa Colina Hospital Los Angeles 106190137 
Children's Hospital - San Diego San Diego 106370673 
Children's Hospital & Research Center at Oakland Alameda 106010776 
Children's Hospital at Mission Orange 106304113 
Children's Hospital Central California Madera 106204019 
Children's Hospital of Los Angeles Los Angeles 106190170 
Children's Hospital of Orange County Orange 106300032 
Chinese Hospital San Francisco 106382715 
Citrus Valley Medical Center Los Angeles 106190636 
City of Hope National Medical Center Los Angeles 106190176 
Colusa Regional Medical Center Colusa 106060870 
Community Hospital of Long Beach Los Angeles 106190475 
Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula Monterey 106270744 
Community Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura Ventura 106560473 
Dameron Hospital Association San Joaquin 106390846 
Daniel Freeman Memorial Hospital Los Angeles 106190230 
Delano Regional Medical Center Kern 106150706 
Dominican Hospital Santa Cruz 106440755 
Donald N. Sharp Memorial Community Hospital San Diego 106370694 
Dos Palos Memorial Hospital Merced 106240853 
Downey Regional Medical Center Los Angeles 106190243 
East Valley Hospital Medical Center Los Angeles 106190328 
Eisenhower Medical Center Riverside 106331168 
El Camino Hospital Santa Clara 106430763 
Enloe Medical Center Butte 106040962 
Fairchild Medical Center Siskiyou 106474007 
Foothill Hospital - Morris L. Johnston Memorial Los Angeles 106190298 
Fremont Medical Center Sutter 106510882 
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Facility Name County Facility No. 
French Hospital Medical Center San Luis Obispo 106400480 
Gateways Hospital & Mental Health Center Los Angeles 106190317 
George L. Mee Memorial Hospital Monterey 106270777 
Glendale Memorial Hospital & Health Center Los Angeles 106190522 
Glenn Medical Center Glenn 106110889 
Goleta Valley Cottage Hospital Santa Barbara 106420483 
Green Hospital of Scripps Clinic San Diego 106371256 
Grossmont Hospital San Diego 106370714 
Hanford Community Medical Center Kings 106160725 
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital Los Angeles 106190949 
Huntington Memorial Hospital Los Angeles 106190400 
John Muir Medical Center Contra Costa 106070988 
Kedren Community Mental Health Center Los Angeles 106190150 
Kindred Hospital - Rancho San Bernardino 106364188 
La Palma Intercommunity Hospital Orange 106301234 
Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute San Francisco 106380868 
Lodi Memorial Hospital San Joaquin 106390923 
Loma Linda University Behavioral Medicine Center San Bernardino 106364014 
Loma Linda University Medical Center San Bernardino 106361246 
Long Beach Memorial Medical Center Los Angeles 106190525 
Madera Community Hospital Madera 106201281 
Marin General Hospital Marin 106211006 
Mark Twain St. Joseph's Hospital Calaveras 106050932 
Memorial Hospital Los Banos Merced 106240924 
Memorial Medical Center Stanislaus 106500939 
Mercy General Hospital Sacramento 106340947 
Mercy Healthcare Bakersfield Kern 106150761 
Mercy Hospital - Community Campus Merced 106240942 
Mercy Hospital & Health Services Merced 106240948 
Mercy Hospital of Folsom Sacramento 106344029 
Mercy Hospital of Mt. Shasta Siskiyou 106470871 
Mercy Medical Center Redding Shasta 106450949 
Mercy San Juan Hospital Sacramento 106340950 
Merritt Peralta Chemical Dependency Recovery Hospital Alameda 106013687 
Miller Children's Hospital Los Angeles 106196168 
Mills Peninsula Medical Center San Mateo 106410852 
Mission Community Hospital Los Angeles 106190524 
Motion Picture & Television Fund Los Angeles 106190552 
Mt. Diablo Medical Center Contra Costa 106071018 
Mt. Diablo Medical Pavilion Contra Costa 106074039 
NorthBay Medical Center Solano 106481357 
Northridge Hospital Medical Center Los Angeles 106190568 
Northridge Hospital Medical Center - Sherman Way Los Angeles 106190810 
Novato Community Hospital Marin 106214034 
O'Connor Hospital Santa Clara 106430837 
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Facility Name County Facility No. 
Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center Orange 106300225 
Parkview Community Hospital Medical Center Riverside 106331293 
Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center Los Angeles 106190630 
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital Los Angeles 106190631 
Providence Holy Cross Medical Center Los Angeles 106190385 
Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center Los Angeles 106190758 
Queen of the Valley Hospital Napa 106281047 
Redlands Community Hospital San Bernardino 106361308 
Redwood Memorial Hospital Humboldt 106121051 
Rehabilitation Institute at Santa Barbara Santa Barbara 106424047 
Rideout Memorial Hospital Yuba 106580996 
Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center Los Angeles 106190366 
Saddleback Memorial Medical Center Orange 106301317 
Saint Agnes Medical Center Fresno 106100899 
Saint Francis Memorial Hospital San Francisco 106380960 
San Antonio Community Hospital San Bernardino 106361318 
San Diego Hospice & Palliative Care San Diego 106374084 
San Joaquin Community Hospital Kern 106150788 
Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital Santa Barbara 106420514 
Santa Monica - UCLA Medical Center Los Angeles 106190687 
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital Sonoma 106491064 
Santa Teresita Hospital Los Angeles 106190691 
Santa Ynez Valley Cottage Hospital Santa Barbara 106420522 
Scripps Health - La Jolla San Diego 106370771 
Scripps Memorial Hospital - Chula Vista San Diego 106370658 
Scripps Memorial Hospital - Encinitas San Diego 106371394 
Scripps Mercy Hospital San Diego 106370744 
Seton Medical Center San Mateo 106410817 
Seton Medical Center - Coastside San Mateo 106410828 
Sharp Cabrillo Hospital San Diego 106370693 
Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center San Diego 106370875 
Sharp Coronado Hospital San Diego 106370689 
Sharp Mary Birch Women's Hospital San Diego 106370695 
Sharp Mesa Vista Hospital San Diego 106370745 
Sharp Vista Pacifica San Diego 106374049 
Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital Nevada 106291023 
Sonora Community Hospital Tuolumne 106551034 
Sonora Regional Medical Center Tuolumne 106554011 
Southwest Healthcare System Riverside 106334068 
St. Elizabeth Hospital Tehama 106521041 
St. Francis Medical Center Los Angeles 106190754 
St. Helena Hospital Napa 106281078 
St. John's Pleasant Valley Hospital Ventura 106560508 
St. John's Regional Medical Center Ventura 106560529 
St. Joseph Hospital Orange 106301340 
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Facility Name County Facility No. 
St. Joseph Hospital - Eureka Humboldt 106121080 
St. Luke's Hospital San Francisco 106380964 
St. Mary Medical Center San Bernardino 106361343 
St. Mary Medical Center Los Angeles 106190053 
St. Vincent Medical Center Los Angeles 106190762 
Sutter Amador Hospital Amador 106034002 
Sutter Auburn Faith Hospital Placer 106310791 
Sutter Center For Psychiatry Sacramento 106344017 
Sutter Coast Hospital Del Norte 106084001 
Sutter Davis Hospital Yolo 106574010 
Sutter Delta Medical Center Contra Costa 106070934 
Sutter General & Sutter Memorial Hospitals Sacramento 106341051 
Sutter Lakeside Hospital Lake 106171395 
Sutter Maternity & Surgery Center of Santa Cruz Santa Cruz 106444012 
Sutter Medical Center of Santa Rosa Sonoma 106490919 
Sutter Roseville Medical Center Placer 106311000 
Sutter Solano Medical Center Solano 106481094 
Sutter Tracy Community Hospital San Joaquin 106391056 
Tarzana Psychiatric Hospital Los Angeles 106190782 
The Medical Center at UCSF San Francisco 106381154 
Thunder Road Chemical Dependency Recovery Hospital Alameda 106010782 
Tom Redgate Memorial Recovery Center Los Angeles 106191225 
Torrance Memorial Medical Center Los Angeles 106190422 
Tri-City Regional Medical Center Los Angeles 106190159 
UCI Medical Center Orange 106301279 
UCLA Medical Center Los Angeles 106190796 
UCLA Neuropsychiatric Hospital Los Angeles 106190930 
UCSD Medical Center San Diego 106370782 
Ukiah Valley Medical Center Mendocino 106231396 
University Community Medical Center San Diego 106370787 
University of California, Davis Medical Center Sacramento 106341006 
VacaValley Hospital Solano 106484001 
Valley Memorial Hospital Alameda 106010983 
Valleycare Medical Center Alameda 106014050 
Verdugo Hills Hospital Los Angeles 106190818 
Victor Valley Community Hospital San Bernardino 106361370 
Watsonville Community Hospital Santa Cruz 106444013 
White Memorial Medical Center Los Angeles 106190878 
Woodland Memorial Hospital Yolo 106571086 
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Panel B: Number of Hospitals by County 
 
 
County Secular Religious Total 
Alameda 7 0 7 
Amador 1 0 1 
Butte 2 0 2 
Calaveras 1 0 1 
Colusa 1 0 1 
Contra Costa 4 0 4 
Del Norte 1 0 1 
El Dorado 1 0 1 
Fresno 0 1 1 
Glenn 1 0 1 
Humboldt 1 1 2 
Kern 4 0 4 
Kings 1 0 1 
Lake 1 0 1 
Lassen 1 0 1 
Los Angeles 39 3 42 
Madera 2 0 2 
Marin 2 0 2 
Mendocino 0 1 1 
Merced 4 0 4 
Monterey 2 0 2 
Napa 1 1 2 
Nevada 1 0 1 
Orange 6 1 7 
Placer 2 0 2 
Riverside 4 0 4 
Sacramento 4 2 6 
San Bernardino 6 1 7 
San Diego 17 0 17 
San Francisco 6 0 6 
San Joaquin 3 0 3 
San Luis Obispo 2 0 2 
San Mateo 3 0 3 
Santa Barbara 4 0 4 
Santa Clara 1 1 2 
Santa Cruz 3 0 3 
Shasta 0 1 1 
Siskiyou 2 0 2 
Solano 4 0 4 
Sonoma 1 1 2 
Stanislaus 1 0 1 
Sutter 1 0 1 
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County Secular Religious Total 
Tehama 0 1 1 
Tuolumne 1 1 2 
Ventura 2 1 3 
Yolo 2 0 2 
Yuba 1 0 1 
TOTAL 154 17 171 
    
Notes: Panel A presents a listing of all hospitals included in the earnings management analyses (n = 5,529).  Panel 
B lists the number of secular and religious hospitals by county.   
 
  
 84 
  
APPENDIX 3 – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
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List of Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
ACA Coded 1 if observation is after Q1-2010 (post ACA reporting requirements), 0 
otherwise. 
ACA_REL Interaction of ACA and REL_OWN. 
BEDS Number of staffed beds (in hundreds). 
BOD_SIZE Number of hospital board members (in hundreds). 
CA Change in contractual allowances, scaled by total assets from previous year. 
CASH Days cash on hand, measured following Eldenburg and Vines (2004) as 
follows: (cash + marketable securities + unrestricted investments)/[(total 
expense – depreciation)/365]. 
CHAR_GR Charity care as a percentage of total gross revenue. 
CHAR_UN Change in charity care as a percentage of uncompensated care, measured as the 
current quarter minus the previous quarter. 
CHAR_UN3Q Change in charity care as a percentage of uncompensated care, measured as the 
current quarter minus the average of the previous three quarters. 
CHAR_UP Coded 1 if CHAR_UN is greater than 0, 0 otherwise. 
CHAR_UP3Q Coded 1 if CHAR_UN3Q is greater than 0, 0 otherwise. 
DCA_LV Empirical proxy for earnings management, measured as the absolute value of 
the residuals from the Leone & Van Horn (2005) annual DCA regressions 
(∆CA = β0 + β1∆GR_TOTAL + β2∆GR_MCARE + β3∆GR_MCAID + ε) 
discussed in detail in section III. 
DCA_MLV Empirical proxy for earnings management, measured as the absolute value of 
the residuals from the Modified Leone & Van Horn (2005) annual DCA 
regressions (∆CA = β0 + β1∆GR_TOTAL + β2∆GR_MCARE + β3∆GR_MCAID 
+ β4∆GR_THIRD + ε) discussed in detail in section III. 
FQ4 Coded 1 if fiscal quarter equals 4, 0 otherwise. 
GOV_REV Sum of Medicare and Medicaid gross revenue as a percentage of total gross 
revenue. 
GR_MCAID Change in Medicaid gross revenue. 
GR_MCARE Change in Medicare gross revenue. 
GR_REV Total gross patient revenue, scaled by total assets from previous year. 
GR_THIRD Change in Third Party gross revenue. 
GR_TOTAL Change in total gross revenue. 
OP_INC Operating income for the first three fiscal quarters, scaled by total assets from 
previous year. 
REL_CTY County-level measure of religious adherence, as collected in 2010 by the 
Association of Religion Data Archives. 
REL_OWN Coded 1 if hospital is church owned, 0 otherwise. 
RURAL Coded 1 if hospital is located in a rural area as defined by OSHPD, 0 
otherwise. 
  
Notes: All variables are downloaded from the OSHPD from the state of California. 
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APPENDIX 4 – QUARTERLY REPORT EXAMPLE 
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Quarterly Report Example – John Muir Medical Center 
Facility: JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CTR-WALNUT CREEK OSHPD ID: 106070988 
1601 YGNACIO VALLEY ROAD, WALNUT CREEK, CA 94598 RPE Date: 12/31/2012 
 
  
6. Report Prepared By Gina Holmes 
7. Report Preparer's Phone Number 925-941-2146 
8. Chief Executive Officer J. KENDALL ANDERSON 
9. Main Hospital Phone (925)939-3000 
10. Disaster Coordinator's Phone (925)939-3000 EXT 5343 
19. Report Period Start Date 2012-10-01 
20. Report Period End Date 2012-12-31 
   
Beds (excl. nursery bassinets) Current Qtr Last Qtr 
25. Licensed Beds (End of report period) 572 572 
Licensed Bed Occupancy Rate 41.23 41.58 
30. Available Beds (Average for report period) 399 399 
Available Bed Occupancy Rate 59.1 59.6 
35. Staffed Beds (Average for report period) 236 238 
Staffed Bed Occupancy Rate 99.93 99.92 
   
Discharges (excl. nursery discharges) Current Qtr Last Qtr 
50. Medicare - Traditional 1,663 1,679 
55. Medicare - Managed Care 367 377 
60. Medi-Cal - Traditional 80 82 
65. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 195 201 
70. County Indigent Programs - Traditional 25 0 
75. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
80. Other Third Parties - Traditional 87 81 
85. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 1,916 1,880 
90. Other Indigent 0 0 
95. Other Payers 135 191 
100. Total Hospital Discharges (sum of lines 50 thru 95) 4,468 4,491 
105. Long-Term Care (LTC) Discharges (optional) 0 0 
   
Patient (Census) Days (excl. nursery days) Current Qtr Last Qtr 
150. Medicare - Traditional 8,643 8,957 
155. Medicare - Managed Care 1,829 2,092 
160. Medi-Cal - Traditional 926 757 
165. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 878 956 
170. County Indigent Programs - Traditional 150 0 
175. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
180. Other Third Parties - Traditional 378 364 
185. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 8,218 7,584 
190. Other Indigent 0 0 
195. Other Payers 674 1,169 
200. Total Patient (Census) Days (sum of lines 150 thru 195) 21,696 21,879 
205. Long-Term Care (LTC) Patient Days (optional) 0 0 
 
  
Average Length of Stay Current Qtr Last Qtr 
Medicare - Traditional 5.2 5.3 
Medicare - Managed Care 5 5.5 
Medi-Cal - Traditional 11.6 9.2 
Medi-Cal - Managed Care 4.5 4.8 
County Indigent Programs - Traditional 6 0 
County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
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Other Third Parties - Traditional 4.3 4.5 
Other Third Parties - Managed Care 4.3 4 
Other Indigent 0 0 
Other Payers 5 6.1 
Overall Average $4.90  $4.90  
Long-Term Care Average Length of Stay (LOS) 0 0 
   
Outpatient Visits Current Qtr Last Qtr 
250. Medicare - Traditional 25,379 25,538 
255. Medicare - Managed Care 5,543 6,067 
260. Medi-Cal - Traditional 949 611 
265. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 866 762 
270. County Indigent Programs - Traditional 5 1 
275. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
280. Other Third Parties - Traditional 7,599 7,657 
285. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 33,213 32,519 
290. Other Indigent 0 0 
295. Other Payers 1,001 1,139 
300. Total Outpatient Visits (sum of lines 250 thru 295) 74,555 74,294 
   
Gross Inpatient Revenue Current Qtr Last Qtr 
350. Medicare - Traditional 212,199,017 215,295,861 
355. Medicare - Managed Care 46,333,404 49,884,285 
360. Medi-Cal - Traditional 21,841,651 18,294,524 
365. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 29,473,581 23,217,179 
370. County Indigent Programs - Traditional 3,604,003 0 
375. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
380. Other Third Parties - Traditional 12,151,733 14,476,808 
385. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 195,862,467 189,281,861 
390. Other Indigent 0 0 
395. Other Payers 10,374,652 27,674,480 
400. Total Gross Inpatient Revenue (sum of lines 350 thru 395) 531,840,508 538,124,998 
   
Gross Inpatient Revenue Per Day Current Qtr Last Qtr 
Medicare - Traditional 24,552 24,037 
Medicare - Managed Care 25,333 23,845 
Medi-Cal - Traditional 23,587 24,167 
Medi-Cal - Managed Care 33,569 24,286 
County Indigent Programs - Traditional 24,027 0 
County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
Other Third Parties - Traditional 32,147 39,771 
Other Third Parties - Managed Care 23,833 24,958 
Other Indigent 0 0 
Other Payers 15,393 23,674 
Overall Average 24,513 24,596 
   
Gross Inpatient Revenue Per Discharge Current Qtr Last Qtr 
Medicare - Traditional 127,600 128,229 
Medicare - Managed Care 126,249 132,319 
Medi-Cal - Traditional 273,021 223,104 
Medi-Cal - Managed Care 151,147 115,508 
County Indigent Programs - Traditional 144,160 0 
County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
Other Third Parties - Traditional 139,675 178,726 
Other Third Parties - Managed Care 102,225 100,682 
Other Indigent 0 0 
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Other Payers 76,849 144,893 
Overall Average 119,033 119,823 
   
Gross Outpatient Revenue Current Qtr Last Qtr 
450. Medicare - Traditional 56,166,041 55,283,480 
455. Medicare - Managed Care 16,577,572 16,889,219 
460. Medi-Cal - Traditional 2,842,864 1,788,099 
465. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 4,445,769 4,431,004 
470. County Indigent Programs - Traditional 144,616 9,415 
475. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
480. Other Third Parties - Traditional 6,244,689 5,798,480 
485. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 82,593,286 78,633,140 
490. Other Indigent 0 0 
495. Other Payers 7,114,732 7,663,859 
500. Total Gross Outpatient Revenue (sum of lines 450 thru 495) 176,129,569 170,496,696 
   
Gross Outpatient Revenue Per Visit Current Qtr Last Qtr 
Medicare - Traditional 2,213 2,165 
Medicare - Managed Care 2,991 2,784 
Medi-Cal - Traditional 2,996 2,927 
Medi-Cal - Managed Care 5,134 5,815 
County Indigent Programs - Traditional 28,923 9,415 
County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
Other Third Parties - Traditional 822 757 
Other Third Parties - Managed Care 2,487 2,418 
Other Indigent 0 0 
Other Payers 7,108 6,729 
Overall Average 2,362 2,295 
   
Deductions from Revenue Current Qtr Last Qtr 
545. Provision for Bad Debts 3,420,163 15,912,647 
550. Medicare - Traditional Contractual Adjustments 229,654,752 234,667,016 
555. Medicare - Managed Care Contractual Adjustments 52,152,998 50,854,321 
560. Medi-Cal - Traditional Contractual Adjustments 13,623,502 26,387,266 
565. Medi-Cal - Managed Care Contractual Adjustments 31,198,117 24,285,781 
566. Disproportionate Share Payments for Medi-Cal (SB 855) (credit bal) 0 0 
570. County Indigent Programs - Traditional Contractual Adjustments 3,326,842 4,237 
575. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care Contractual Adjustments 0 0 
580. Other Third Parties - Traditional Contractual Adjustments 11,459,669 13,084,996 
585. Other Third Parties - Managed Care Contractual Adjustments 157,277,717 159,657,387 
590. Charity - Hill-Burton 0 0 
595. Charity - Other 15,622,788 8,298,197 
600. Restricted Donations & Subsidies for Indigent Care (credit balance) 0 0 
605. Teaching Allowance 0 0 
610. Clinical Teaching Support (credit balance) 0 0 
615. Other Adjustments and Allowances 4,303,134 6,948,067 
620. Total Deductions from Revenue (sum of lines 545 thru 615) 522,039,682 540,099,915 
   
Capitation Premium Revenue Current Qtr Last Qtr 
650. Medicare - Managed Care 0 0 
660. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 0 0 
670. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
680. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 1,237,388 1,261,303 
700. Total Capitation Premium Revenue (sum of lines 650 thru 680) 1,237,388 1,261,303 
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Net Patient Revenue Current Qtr Last Qtr 
750. Medicare - Traditional 38,710,306 35,912,325 
755. Medicare - Managed Care 10,757,978 15,919,183 
760. Medi-Cal - Traditional 11,061,013 -6,304,643 
765. Medi-Cal - Managed Care 2,721,233 3,362,402 
770. County Indigent Programs - Traditional 421,777 5,178 
775. County Indigent Programs - Managed Care 0 0 
780. Other Third Parties - Traditional 6,936,753 7,190,292 
785. Other Third Parties - Managed Care 122,415,424 109,518,917 
790. Other Indigent 0 0 
795. Other Payers -5,856,701 4,179,428 
800. Total Net Patient Revenue (sum of 750 thru 795)(400+500-620+700) 187,167,783 169,783,082 
   
Other Revenue and Expenses Current Qtr Last Qtr 
810. Other Operating Revenue 17,548,317 21,140,287 
830. Total Operating Expenses 172,228,214 174,634,856 
835. Physician Professional Component (PPC) Expenses (optional) 0 0 
840. Nonoperating Revenue Net of Nonoperating Expenses 2,896,823 -472,053 
   
Purchased Inpatient Services (optional) Current Qtr Last Qtr 
850. Discharges 0 0 
855. Patient Days 0 0 
860. Expenses 0 0 
   
Purchased Outpatient Services (optional) Current Qtr Last Qtr 
870. Expenses 0 0 
   
Other Financial Data Current Qtr Last Qtr 
880. Total Capital Expenditures 981,318 3,899,732 
885. Fixed Assets Net of Accumulated Depreciation 627,941,426 635,394,666 
900. Disproportionate Share Funds Transferred to Related Entity (optional) 0 0 
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